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INTRODUCTION
To deny all remedy is to deny the right itself. Judges can
deny any enforcement of the plaintiff’s right where the
plaintiff has forfeited the right by his conduct, as in estoppel cases. Judges can also deny remedies on the basis
of cost-benefit balances. But not so easy to think that the
Congress means statutory rights to come and go in the
discretion of a federal judge. Indeed, the concept of a
right is at odds with the concept of discretion to deny the
right.1
This Article addresses the current debate over whether to extend, to trademark law, the rule in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C. denying prevailing patent plaintiffs presumptive entitlement
to injunctive relief.2 Its central concern, however, is not whether or
how eBay should apply to trademark law, but rather the way in
which the debate resurfaces structural flaws undermining foundational provisions of the Lanham Act. Namely, the Act purports to
grant ex ante exclusive rights to mark owners against all confusingly similar uses, but then reserves discretion to district courts to deny statutory injunctive relief without further guidance.3 This ambiguity, a familiar one to the broader subject area of statutory injunctions, is particularly acute in the trademark space because the Lanham Act conflictingly aimed both to codify state-based common
law trademark practices, and to create a national statutory right.
Part I of this Article analyzes the debate over eBay’s place in
trademark infringement law, revealing the trouble this issue has
posed for federal courts and commentators alike.4 Subsequent decisions reveal deep conflicts at the appellate level and widespread
confusion among the district courts. Commentators, too, seem unable to reach consensus. Practitioners and black letter trademark
1

DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.10, at 248 (2d ed. 1993).
547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
3
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2012).
4
This Article does not directly address what impact, if any, eBay has had on
alternative Lanham Act causes of actions such as dilution, false advertising, and
cybersquatting. Instead, it focuses on the core of trademark law—claims for infringement
of registered and unregistered trademarks under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and § 1125(a)(1)(A)
(Lanham Act sections 32 and 43(a)(1)(A), respectively).
2
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authorities, like Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, largely reject eBay
as inconsistent with the purpose of trademark law and structure of
trademark litigation. On the other end of the spectrum, some scholars have embraced eBay as a check on overzealous plaintiffs, including in the trademark space. Adding to the confusion, the available empirical data counterintuitively suggest that trademark injunction win rates have actually increased overall since eBay.
Part II seeks to locate the source of this difficulty and conflict.
It first sets the groundwork by contrasting the nature of trademark
and patent rights in order to reject a common reductive statutory
argument for extending eBay to trademark law. It then seeks to contextualize the debate by positioning it as a particularly knotty instance of the intertwining of equitable discretion with statutory injunctive authority. In the trademark case, the Lanham Act purports
to create a strong form of exclusive right in registered marks. Yet it
then gives discretion to courts to deny injunctive relief even where
plaintiff has demonstrated infringement of this exclusive right and
shown likely continuing harm (to itself and the public). At the same
time, it denies monetary relief except in exceptional cases.
The problem, at heart, is one of statutory construction. This
Article thus turns to the drafting history of the Lanham Act to better understand how the drafters intended to reconcile exclusive
trademark rights with judicial discretion. It argues that neither
Congress nor the drafters of the Act provided a cogent explanation
for granting a strong form of national, exclusive rights to trademark
owners while denying a true entitlement to injunctive relief. Instead, this ambiguity was most likely a product of the Act’s long,
haphazard drafting history, coupled with unresolved conflicts regarding the basic theory of the legislation. Specifically, rather than
provide a logical and consistent explanation for how a regime of
national trademark registration can coexist with geographically limited, state-created common law trademark rights, the Act buried
the controversy (and placated opposition) by retaining some form
of ex post judicial discretion to enforce the supposedly ex ante “exclusive” right.
This Article determines in Part III that the fairest reading of the
Act and its history is that Congress intended to retain the equitable
remedial practices in place in trademark cases at the time the Act
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was passed as a check on national exclusivity given to mark owners.
A review of those historical practices shows that courts presumed a
prevailing trademark infringement plaintiff’s entitlement to injunctive relief, because of the tort’s continuing nature and the harms it
caused to the plaintiff and the public. Courts, moreover, considered injunctive relief the “usual” remedy in trademark cases at
the time. The presumption, however, was subject to equitable balancing, and defenses such as unclean hands or laches. This conclusion is consistent with the understanding of general remedies
scholars who see statutory injunctive authority as a substitute for
the irreparable harm or adequacy of damages rules, but not as any
sort of categorical entitlement.
This Article concludes with the reflection that eBay, more than
anything else, has revealed anew the Lanham Act’s deep internal
conflicts—particularly the way in which it sought simultaneously
to codify the common law of trademarks and create a national exclusive right. The trouble with eBay is another instance of the
trouble with trademarks generally.5 Ultimately, though, the elaborate balance of presumptions and defenses achieved by the courts
up until eBay likely comes closest to achieving the Act’s original, if
murky, vision for statutory injunctions granted “according to the
principles of equity.”6
I. EBAY’S TRADEMARK ENIGMA
A. The eBay “Juggernaut”
In the spring of 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court shook the patent world by issuing its terse opinion in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.7 A “categorical” Federal Circuit axiom—that a prevailing
patent infringement plaintiff was entitled to enjoin, permanently,
the infringing use of its claimed invention—was suddenly and
soundly rejected.8 In place of that rule, the Supreme Court insti5

Cf. Stephen Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759 (1990) (exploring
inconsistencies between theory of federal trademark law and reality of trademark usage).
6
15 U.S.C. § 1116.
7
eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
8
Id. at 393–94 (citing MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)) (discussing the preexisting “general rule”).
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tuted a test that it controversially characterized as reflecting “traditional” and “well-established” equitable principals:9
[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must
satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant
such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it
has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.10
Two concurrences followed the unanimous majority opinion.
The first, written by Chief Justice Roberts, emphasized that while
the Court was rejecting the Federal Circuit’s attempt to impose a
“general rule” entitling plaintiffs to injunctive relief, it still approved of the historical practice of granting “injunctive relief upon
a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.”11
The second, by Justice Kennedy, suggested that the Court saw a
need to give district court judges more remedial discretion in response to the newly emergent problem of patent trolls (“firms
[that] use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but,
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”).12
For reasons that will surely be subject of scholarly debate for
some time, the eBay four-factor “juggernaut” of a test immediately
then began its jurisprudential ascent.13 As mapped out by Gergen,
Golden, and Smith, courts soon extended eBay to cover preliminary injunctions and rejected any presumptions establishing that a
party had met any element of the eBay test (such as the irreparable
harm element).14 Courts expanded their reach to other subject
9

Id. at 391, 393.
Id. at 391.
11
Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
12
Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
13
Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for
Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 206 (2012).
14
Id. at 217 (citing Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78, 78 n.7 (2d Cir. 2010)); see
also Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1334, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(applying eBay to motion for preliminary injunction just weeks after eBay was issued).
10
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areas both within and outside of the intellectual property field.15
Even state courts welcomed eBay.16 Despite, in short, some fairly
serious scholarly doubts expressed as to the four-factor test’s provenance,17 internal logic,18 and sense,19 eBay ignited a remedial
“revolution.”20
B. eBay’s Trademark Mess in the Federal Courts
1. The Trademark Injunction Presumption Before eBay
Prior to eBay, almost all federal appellate courts presumed that
a trademark plaintiff would be irreparably harmed by continuing
trademark infringement.21 This rule generally governed both preThe conflation of permanent with preliminary injunctive relief practice is particularly
troubling in the post-eBay case law. In the context of preliminary (as opposed to
permanent) relief, the irreparable harm and adequacy rules “have an entirely different
purpose, an entirely different effect, and an entirely different meaning.” DOBBS, supra
note 1, § 2.5(1), at 127; see infra Section I.B.2.d (discussing this point in the context of
statutory injunctions).
15
Gergen et al., supra note 13, at 214–19 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
561 U.S. 139 (2010) (applying eBay to environmental and administrative law); Kartman v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying eBay to a
diversity-based insurance class action)) (outlining expanding reach of eBay).
16
Id. at 215 n.51 (citing state cases applying eBay).
17
Id. at 214 (summarizing four ways in which the eBay test differs from “traditional
equity: (1) the privileging of the four factors as elements of a canonical test; (2) the
redundant statement of an irreparable-injury requirement; (3) the formulation of the test
as a four-pronged one that requires separate establishment of each prong; and (4) the
potential obliteration of even rebuttable presumptions with respect to satisfaction of any
of the test’s prongs”).
18
Id. at 209–12 (detailing how the eBay test is both redundant (in that requirement one
of irreparable injury is effectively the same as inadequacy of legal remedies) and wrongly
labeled as factors (in that it establishes the four requirements as prongs of a “test”
instead of factors in a balancing analysis)).
19
Id. at 249 (criticizing eBay for varying from “traditional equity” and advocating for a
return of “the structured sets of presumptions and safety valves that have characterized
traditional equitable practice [and that] seem more likely than a bare four-factor test to
combine general predictability, specific flexibility, and targeted effect in a way that
satisfactorily resolves social concerns across a broad spectrum of fact patterns and legal
areas”).
20
Id. at 204 (noting that “[t]he law of equitable remedies is in the midst of an
American revolution,” and identifying eBay as the cause).
21
See, e.g., Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 726, 732 (3d Cir. 2004)
(reversing denial of preliminary injunction and stating “trademark infringement amounts
to irreparable injury as a matter of law” (quoting S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968
F.2d 371, 378 (3d Cir. 1992))); Brennan’s Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest. L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125,
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liminary and permanent relief.22 As the Third Circuit put it in a
leading case, “trademark infringement amounts to irreparable injury as a matter of law.”23
Even, for instance, where an appellate court expressly deferred
to a district court’s finding that no serious health risk to the public
129 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that “proof of a likelihood of confusion establishes both
likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm”); Genesee Brewing Co., Inc. v.
Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing how a showing of a
likelihood of confusion establishes irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the
merits); Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 640, 644
(1st Cir. 1992) (“By its very nature, trademark infringement results in irreparable harm
because the attendant loss of profits, goodwill, and reputation cannot be satisfactorily
quantified and, thus, the trademark owner cannot adequately be compensated. Hence,
irreparable harm flows from an unlawful trademark infringement as a matter of law.”);
Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16, 18 (7th Cir. 1992) (reciting the
“well-established” presumption that injuries under the Lanham Act are irreparable
because the economic losses of intangible harms (e.g., loss of goodwill and damage to
reputation) are “virtually impossible” to determine); Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv.
Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 608 (6th Cir. 1991) (adopting the presumption of irreparable harm in
trademark infringement actions); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 612
n.3 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that establishing that a likelihood of confusion in trademark
infringement actions typically presumes that irreparable harm will be suffered if
injunctive relief is not granted); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403
n.11 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that proving actual damage or injury is not necessary to obtain
injunctive relief, a plaintiff only needs to prove the likelihood of confusion to establish its
right to an injunction); E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imps., Inc., 756
F.2d 1525, 1529–30 (11th Cir. 1985) (recognizing presumption and noting that “a
sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of confusion may by itself constitute a showing
of . . . a substantial threat of irreparable harm”); Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold
Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 753 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that a court may “presume
irreparable injury from a finding of probable success in proving likelihood of confusion”);
Marker Int’l v. de Bruler, 635 F. Supp. 986, 998 (D. Utah 1986) (discussing how
demonstrating a likelihood of confusion entitles a plaintiff to injunctive relief because
irreparable injury is presumed); see also 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:47 (4th ed. 2015) (“The rule followed by
almost all courts is that irreparable injury is presumed if a likelihood of success on the
merits of trademark infringement is proven.”).
22
Compare Kos Pharm., 369 F.3d at 726 (preliminary injunction), with Mutual of
Omaha, 836 F.2d at 403 n.11 (permanent injunction).
23
S & R, 968 F.2d at 378. One exception to this trend, discussed infra Section I.B.2.c,
appears to have been the Fifth Circuit. Although some district courts in that circuit
occasionally used language suggesting a presumption (see, e.g., Quantum Fitness Corp. v.
Quantum Lifestyle Ctrs., L.L.C., 83 F. Supp. 2d 810, 831 (S.D. Tex. 1999)), the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless “avoided ‘expressly adopting this presumption of
irreparable injury.’” Paulsson Geophysical Servs. Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312 (5th
Cir. 2008).
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existed from the continuing sale of a cholesterol drug with a name
confusingly similar to another, it still concluded that the district
court clearly erred by not preliminarily enjoining use of the infringing mark.24 The lower court failed to consider the public’s right
“not to be deceived or confused” independently of any right to be
free from health risks.25 Indeed, the Court of Appeals did not even
remand for further fact-finding on the issue, but rather instructed
the lower court to enter an expedited preliminary injunction
straight away.26
Many circuits, prior to eBay, further guided their district courts
to consider injunctive relief as “the remedy of choice for trademark
and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at
law for the injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringement.”27 General remedies case books similarly cited trademark
infringement as a black letter example of a cause of action where
injunctive relief is “especially important.”28
24

Kos Pharm., 369 F.3d at 731–32.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)
(affirming district court’s grant of permanent injunction following summary judgment
against terminated licensee). Scholars and courts have long debated whether the
requirement that a plaintiff prove no adequate remedy at law (eBay prong two) is truly
distinct from the requirement of showing that it would be irreparably harmed but for
issuance of an injunction (eBay prong one). This can be particularly confusing when faced
with pre-eBay permanent injunction cases, such as Century 21, which often do not follow
the eBay analytic framework, but speak only of adequacy of non-injunctive relief, or
irreparable harm, without discussion of the other factors. Except where otherwise stated,
this Article will follow the lead of those scholars that consider the two requirements
interchangeably, being more or less mirror images of each other (i.e., a party with no
adequate remedy at law will, by definition, be irreparably harmed by the denial of an
injunction). See Gergen et al., supra note 13, at 209 (“The test’s requirements of (1)
irreparable injury and (2) inadequacy of legal remedies are redundant as these are,
traditionally speaking, one and the same.”); Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable
Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 694 (1990) (“The two formulations are equivalent;
what makes an injury irreparable is that no other remedy can repair it.”).
28
DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.1(2), at 59; see id. § 2.5(2), at 130 n.1 (listing trademark
infringement as an example of a case where “injunctions are so routinely given that they
are sometimes regarded as the normal remedy, to be given irrespective of the adequacy
test”); id. § 2.9(2), at 228 (noting that trademark infringement is “especially welladapted” to injunctive relief); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 938 cmt. b
(AM. LAW INST. 1979) (citing trademark action as an example of a body of law where
injunctions are granted regularly without case by case articulation).
25
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The language in some cases went so far as to suggest that
trademark infringement didn’t just satisfy one factor of a multifactor test (such as irreparable harm), but actually entitled a prevailing plaintiff to an injunction in and of itself. That is, a plaintiff
could more or less rest its case to enjoin infringing use after demonstrating likely confusion with a protected mark: “a court need
only find that a defendant is liable for infringement or unfair competition for it to award injunctive relief.”29
Many rationales have been given for the prevailing trademark
plaintiff’s historic entitlement to either a presumption of irreparable harm or injunctive relief as such. The most common, often advanced by Professor McCarthy, suggests that it stems from the
“inherently” irreparable nature of trademark infringement itself:
The basis of the presumption is that trademark infringement monetary relief is, in the language of equity, inherently “inadequate” and injury is “irreparable.” By showing a likelihood of success in
proving a likelihood of confusion, plaintiff also
shows that . . . it will probably lose control of its
reputation because this reputation rests upon the
quality of defendant’s activities as a result of a likelihood of confusion of purchasers. Such a likelihood
of damage to reputation is by its nature “irreparable.”30
As shown in his use of terms like “inherently” and “by its nature,” McCarthy’s highly influential view of the presumption is at
heart categorical and definitional—it is based on what trademark
infringement is, intrinsically.
Trademark law, under this view, secures control over a mark to
one owner so as to avoid confusion to the public and to protect the
29

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 1999); see also
Topps Co. Inc. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., No. 96 CIV. 7302 (RWS), 1996 WL 719381, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1996) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that in trademark infringement
actions, a finding of likelihood of confusion of a valid trademark between the marks in
question provides sufficient grounds for issuance of a preliminary injunction, without
further evidence of actual injury.” (citing Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Compangna per le
Farmacie in Italia S.p.A, 847 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1988))).
30
5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:47 (discussing preliminary relief).
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value of the brand.31 But at heart it is the loss of control over one’s
reputation, in and of itself, that is the quintessential harm that a
cause of action for trademark infringement seeks to prevent.32 To
McCarthy, the regime is set up, prophylactically, to assume that
unintentionally losing control of one’s reputation to another is per
se harmful.
The presumption of irreparable injury in trademark cases was
also understood to be a specific case of the general remedial rule
that plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed where damages are difficult to quantify,33 or where they would have to sue repeatedly for
successive increments of damage (i.e., to prevent repeating or continuing infringement).34 Indeed, McCarthy draws on this latter rationale as support for enjoining future acts of infringement:
What would happen in a trademark infringement
case if the court were to hold that damages were
adequate to remedy the problem of defendant’s continued acts of confusing customers? If an injunction
were denied, the court would be telling plaintiff to
sit by and watch defendant continue to violate the
law, infringe upon plaintiff’s proven rights and continue to confuse and deceive customers until such
time as plaintiff decided to sue again for money
damages as compensation for the past injury incurred. That would not be anything close to an
“adequate” remedy.35

31

Cf. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.4(5) at 112 (“[T]he public interest represented by
customer confusion weighs in favor of an injunction because it represents a cost being
imposed by defendant’s conduct . . . .”).
32
Cf. Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1091 (7th
Cir. 1988) (“[W]e have held that ‘the owner of a mark is damaged by a later use of a
similar mark which place[s] the owner’s reputation beyond its control, though no loss in
business is shown.’” (emphasis omitted)).
33
Laycock, supra note 27, at 713–14 (listing trademark cases as a category of suit where
damages are difficult to measure which supports a finding of irreparable injury); id. at 714
n.136; DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.5(2), at 131, 134–35.
34
Laycock, supra note 27, at 714–15 (“Damages might not deter repeated violations,
and mounting litigation costs might deter plaintiff from suing before they deterred
defendant from violating the law.”).
35
See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:2.
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Although, as just described, the pre-eBay trademark presumption (whether to the irreparable harm factor or injunctive relief in
general) was powerful and almost universal, it was never absolute
or automatic.36 It was, that is, just a legal presumption always capable of being rebutted.37 Evidence that plaintiff delayed in bringing
suit, for instance, has always been capable of overcoming the presumption of irreparable harm, particularly in the preliminary injunction context.38
2. The Post-eBay Muddle
One attempts a taxonomy of disorder at one’s own peril, particularly when that disorder is shifting in real time. With that said,
in the wake of eBay the federal circuit courts can be roughly arranged into four groups with respect to its application to trademark
law: (i) those that read eBay to bar any use of presumptions in
36

See J. Thomas McCarthy, Are Preliminary Injunctions Against Trademark Infringement
Getting Harder to Achieve?, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1 (2009) (“Even if a presumption of
irreparable injury is triggered, such a presumption can always be rebutted. Where the
equities have balanced in the defendant’s favor, notwithstanding a showing of some
confusion, a preliminary injunction has been denied. The traditional rule creates a
presumption, not an entitlement . . . . As the Second Circuit remarked, the presumption
of irreparable injury ‘leaves the door slightly ajar perhaps for those few cases in other
trademark contexts where irreparable harm does not follow.’” (citing Church of
Scientology Int’l v. Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir.
1986); Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985); SMJ Group, Inc. v.
417 Lafayette Restaurant LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 293–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))).
37
Cf. FED. R. EVID. 301 (“In a civil case . . . the party against whom a presumption is
directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule
does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it
originally.”).
38
See Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that delay in
bringing suit and motion for preliminary injunction “render[s] inoperative any
presumption”); GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting, in the
preliminary injunction context, that “[d]elay in seeking relief, however, undercuts any
presumption that infringement alone has caused irreparable harm pendente lite”). Courts
also regularly deny relief to trademark plaintiffs under the doctrine of unclean hands. See,
e.g., Worthington v. Anderson, 386 F.3d 1314, 1321–22 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming denial
of relief for trademark infringement under doctrine of unclean hands); Federal Folding
Wall Corp. v. Nat’l Folding Wall Corp., 340 F. Supp. 141, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (denying
relief under doctrine of unclean hands where representative of trademark infringement
plaintiff, among other things, breached his contract with defendant and wrongfully caused
a third party to cancel its trademark license with the defendant). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1116
(2012) (establishing that federal court power to grant injunctions against trademark
infringement is subject “to the principles of equity”).
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trademark injunction analyses; (ii) those that consider eBay applicable to trademark injunction cases, but remain noncommittal as to
whether the presumption of irreparable harm might survive in
some form or another; (iii) those seeming to endorse use of a
trademark irreparable harm presumption after eBay; and (iv) those
that have not directly addressed the applicability of eBay to trademark law leaving the district courts to fend for themselves.39
a) Circuits that Read eBay to Bar any Use of Presumptions
in Trademark Injunction Analyses (Third and Ninth
Circuits)
The Ninth Circuit has clearly led all others in its zeal to extend
eBay to trademark law. In a 2013 preliminary injunction case, Herb
Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entertainment Management, Inc., it
relied on eBay and its preliminary injunction analogue, Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,40 to overrule prior
precedent establishing the presumption of irreparable harm in
trademark actions.41 As central support for extending eBay to
trademark law, the court observed that the statutory language in
both the Patent Act and Lanham Act are worded identically in giving the district courts power to grant injunctions in accordance
with “the principles of equity.”42
Perhaps even more meaningful for trademark plaintiffs, the
court went on to hold that “likely” and “actual” irreparable harm
“must be demonstrated,” respectively, to obtain a preliminary and
permanent injunction.43 Conclusory assertions, it underscored, of
“loss of control” to the trademark owner and other “platitudes”
that are “not grounded in any evidence” are insufficient to meet
39

A final category is those circuits where neither appellate courts nor lower tribunals
have addressed the issue at all. As of the publication of this Article, those are limited to
the Federal and D.C. Circuits.
40
555 U.S. 7 (2008).
41
Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., 736 F.3d 1239, 1248–49 (9th Cir.
2013). The court says that it “join[ed]” precedent set by the Eleventh Circuit (in North
American Medical) and the Sixth Circuit in so holding; however, as described below, the
cited opinions are far more equivocal on that point then the Ninth Circuit recognizes. Id.
42
Id. at 1249 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283 and 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a)).
43
Id. Although the court expressly first references “copyright infringement” as to the
preliminary injunction component, it immediately goes on to apply that standard to a
preliminary trademark injunction. Id. at 1250.

638

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:625

this burden.44 Numerous courts have subsequently relied on that
holding for the principle that the presumption of irreparable harm
no longer exists in the Ninth Circuit.45
It is difficult to understand why a prevailing trademark plaintiff
should be required to show actual harm to receive a permanent injunction when the standard for liability has only ever required a
showing of likely (not actual) confusion.46 When combined with the
rule that requires a showing of actual confusion to receive monetary damages,47 this means that in the Ninth Circuit a finding of
liability premised on likely confusion entitles you to no relief at all.
Following the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit also extended
eBay and Winter to the Lanham Act, and overruled prior cases that
had allowed for a presumption of irreparable harm.48 Although arising in a false advertising context, the expansive discussion within
the opinion, and later cases, make clear that the court meant for it
to apply with equal force to Lanham Act trademark infringement
cases.49
44

Id.
See, e.g., San Miguel Pure Foods Co. v. Ramar Int’l Corp., No. 13-55537, 2015 WL
5042914, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2015) (reversing grant of permanent injunction to
prevailing trademark infringement plaintiff because it was error to presume irreparable
harm, and such harm “may not be based on speculative injury”); Haas Automation, Inc.
v. Denny, No. 2:12-CV-04779 (CBM) (PLAx), 2014 WL 2966989, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 1,
2014) (denying injunction for lack of evidence of irreparable harm; refusing to presume
irreparable harm from likely confusion alone); AFD China Intellectual Prop. Law (USA)
Office, Inc. v. AFD China Intellectual Prop. Law Office, No. 3:09-cv-1509-BR, 2014 WL
2619644, at *6 (D. Or. June 12, 2014) (denying permanent injunctive relief to prevailing
trademark plaintiff unable to show “actual” irreparable harm); OTR Wheel Eng’g, Inc. v.
W. Worldwide Servs., No. CV-14-085-LRS, 2014 WL 1922744, at *4 (E.D. Wash. May
14, 2014) (refusing to apply a presumption, but still finding likelihood of irreparable harm
in trade dress infringement action). Courts in the Ninth Circuit have even extended Herb
Reed to serial cybersquatting cases. See Shutterstock, Inc. v. Pikulski, No. 14CV869
WQH-NLS, 2014 WL 2154266, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2014) (denying motion for
preliminary injunction where plaintiff failed to show likely irreparable injury regardless of
its likelihood of success on the merits against serial typosquatter).
46
See discussion infra Section II.A.1.
47
See discussion infra Section III.B.
48
Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
49
Id. (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s extension of the eBay analysis to a trademark
infringement claim is “[c]onsistent with our holding”); accord Arrowpoint Capital Corp.
v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-3063, 2015 WL 4366571, at *8 n.15 (3d Cir.
2015) (rejecting, in dicta, party’s assertion that actual confusion can still create a
presumption of irreparable harm, and citing Ferring Pharmaceuticals for rule that a party is
45
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b) Noncommittal or Equivocating Circuits (First, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits)
Appellate courts in the First, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits
agree that eBay’s balancing test applies to trademark injunction
practice, however these courts hedge as to what that means for the
presumption of irreparable harm.
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach in North American Medical
Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc. fully reveals this tension. The court
expressly concluded that eBay, despite being a patent case, was
“applicable” to the trademark infringement preliminary injunction
motion before it.50 Contrary though to the understanding of the
Ninth Circuit, which claimed to “join” the Eleventh when it went
on to abrogate the presumption of irreparable harm,51 the court in
North American Medical actually refused to extend its holding that
far.52 Rather, twice using the unfortunately vague and discretionary
term “may well,” it remanded to the district court to determine
how eBay ought to apply under the facts of the case before it:
[T]he district court may well conclude on remand
that it can readily reach an appropriate decision by
fully applying eBay without the benefit of a presumption of irreparable injury, or it may well decide
that the particular circumstances of the instant case
bear substantial parallels to previous cases such that
a presumption of irreparable injury is an appropriate

not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm when bringing a motion for preliminary
injunction in a trademark infringement suit); Broadcase Music, Inc. v. Publick House
Partners, LLC, No. 13-03326 (WHW)(CLW). 2015 WL 3396804, at *4 (D.N.J. May 26,
2015) (noting, in a copyright infringement dispute, that Ferring Pharmaceuticals concerned
“trademark infringement cases”). Interestingly, however, at least one subsequent district
court opinion in the Third Circuit considering an injunction for trademark infringement
seems to have been unaware of Ferring Pharmaceuticals, because it continued to assert that
“[t]rademark infringement constitutes an irreparable injury as a matter of law.” Ramada
Worldwide, Inc. v. Van Horn Hosp., LLC, No. 13-7105, 2015 WL 150090, at *4 (D.N.J.
Jan. 12, 2015).
50
N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).
51
Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013).
52
N. Am. Med., 522 F.3d at 1228 (“[W]e decline to address whether such a
presumption is the equivalent of the categorical rules rejected by the Court in eBay.”).
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exercise of its discretion in light of the historical
traditions.53
Later courts, not surprisingly, have puzzled over the exact
meaning of this command. Many district courts have taken it to
mean that a district court in that circuit is “permitted” to presume
irreparable harm, or not, at its discretion.54 Others understand the
case effectively to have endorsed continuing use of an irreparable
harm presumption after eBay, so long as that presumption is not
used in a “categorical” approach.55 In a recent per curium decision, the Eleventh Circuit went so far as to opine that, even after
North American Medical and eBay, a showing of confusion still “ordinarily warrants injunctive relief,” and reversed a district court
that had denied preliminary injunctive relief on a trademark infringement claim.56
The true divergence from the Ninth Circuit’s absolute approach is starkly revealed in another case involving “The Platters”
trademark.57 A district court in Florida, in evaluating plaintiff Herb
Reed’s request for a preliminary injunction against defendant vocal
group’s use of a variant of that mark, first stated its understanding
that North American Medical left the Eleventh Circuit’s “prior
53

Id.
See, e.g., Nane Jan, LLC v. Seasalt & Pepper, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-208-FtM-29CM,
2014 WL 5177655, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2014); Adidas AG v. adidas2013online.com,
No. 13-24398-CIV, 2013 WL 6667043, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2013) (noting that under
North American Medical, a court is “permitted” to presume irreparable injury or
alternatively may proceed without its benefit, but here choosing not to rely on the
presumption); see also Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1320 (11th Cir. 2010)
(noting that in a false advertising case, because the district court did not rely on a
presumption of irreparable harm, there was no need to decide whether this presumption
is still valid).
55
Commodores Entm’t Corp. v. McClary, No. 6:14-cv-1335-Orl-37GJK, 2014 WL
5285980, at *4 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2014) (presumption survives eBay in Eleventh
Circuit); Luxottica Grp., S.p.A. v. Casa Los Martinez Corp., No. 1:14-cv-22859-JAL,
2014 WL 4948632, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2014) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit
“subscribe[s] to the rule that infringement of a trademark is, by its very nature, an activity
which causes irreparable harm”).
56
Boulan South Beach Master Ass’n, Inc. v. Think Properties, LLC, No. 14-15616,
2015 WL 3542100, at *2 (11th Cir. June 8, 2015) (per curiam).
57
Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. World Famous Platters Rd. Shows I LLC, No. 8:14-cv56-T-17AEP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22046, at *12–13 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2014) (declining
to resolve whether the presumption is still valid in light of eBay and choosing not to apply
it where plaintiff had established irreparable injury in any event).
54
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precedent intact” and allowed it to presume irreparable harm.58
Nevertheless, it did not need to do so because plaintiff adequately
demonstrated irreparable injury by showing that defendants were
using its mark and that such use “could potentially impact plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill.”59 In short, in a case brought by the
same plaintiff and involving the same mark at issue in the Ninth
Circuit’s Herb Reed, a court in the Eleventh Circuit traversed the
Ninth Circuit’s rule both by declaring the continued vitality of the
presumption and by finding irreparable harm based on conclusory
assertions of loss of goodwill and harm to reputation.
The First Circuit has followed a similar trajectory to the Eleventh, though omitting the problematic discretionary language
used by the latter. It has clearly held that eBay’s “traditional equitable principals” apply to trademark cases.60 Although it further
opined that the case possibly “called into question” the longstanding presumption of irreparable harm, it expressly declined to rule
on whether the presumption might nevertheless survive eBay in
some form.61 The court went on to pose this same question three
separate times, without deciding it, in later cases.62
District courts in the First Circuit have split on the application
of the presumption.63 A number cite the eBay factors but then go on
to apply the old presumption, either in the alternative or to satisfy

58

Id.
Id. at *13–14.
60
Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 31–34
(1st Cir. 2011) (noting that “we see no principled reason why [eBay] should not apply in
the present case,” and denying injunction where plaintiff delayed excessively in bringing
suit).
61
Id. (“[W]e decline to decide whether the aforementioned presumption is analogous
to the ‘general’ or ‘categorical’ rules rejected by the Supreme Court in eBay.”).
62
See, e.g., Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. #19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44, 54 (1st Cir.
2013); Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 9 n.11 (1st Cir. 2012)
(“We reiterate here that there is a looming question as to whether this presumption can
co-exist with the Supreme Court’s recent holding in [eBay].”); Mercado-Salinas v. Bart
Enters. Int’l, 671 F.3d 12, 19 n.7 (1st Cir. 2011).
63
165 Park Row, Inc. v. JHR Dev., LLC, No. 2:12-cv-00106-NT, 2014 WL 442554, at
*4–5 (D. Me. Feb. 4, 2014) (performing alternative analyses both if the presumption still
exists and in the event that it no longer does); Vinyl Technologies, Inc. v. Laser
Mechanisms, Inc., No. CIV.A.13-40017-TSH, 2013 WL 1947165, at *2 n.3 (D. Mass. May
9, 2013) (noting possibility that presumption no longer survives in First Circuit).
59
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the irreparable harm prong.64 Others note the tension between the
presumption and eBay and opt to perform a separate analysis for
irreparable harm, often based on general assertions of damage to
goodwill and reputation, rather than apply the presumption.65 One
particularly uncertain court, after an analysis of the tension, noted
that it could “comfortably extend the holding” of eBay to the case
but then went on to apply the presumption.66 Others apply eBay
with no mention of any presumption or discussion of its validity.67
Yet others still apply it, expressly rejecting the idea that eBay impacted the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases.68
Similar to the First Circuit, the Tenth Circuit heard arguments
that a “prima facie case of trademark infringement establishes irreparable harm, per se” just one year after eBay was decided; however, the court declined to address eBay’s impact on the presumption
as unnecessary for disposition of the case.69 Without clear appellate
precedent supporting or overruling the presumption, the district
courts in the Tenth Circuit have published decisions tracking the
outcomes in the First Circuit. One district court applied the presumption, determining that eBay was distinguishable from trademark cases.70 Others list the equitable factors from eBay and apply
64

165 Park Row, 2014 WL 442554, at *4–5 (performing an eBay analysis); Ne. Lumber
Mfrs. Ass’n v. N. States Pallet Co., No. 09-cv-290-LM, 2011 WL 320619, at *3–4
(D.N.H. Jan. 31, 2011) (citing eBay for the four factors considered in granting a permanent
injunction, but applying presumption for irreparable harm factor).
65
Aftermarket Auto Parts Alliance, Inc. v. Bumper2Bumper, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00258NT, 2012 WL 4753407, at *4 (D. Me. Oct. 4, 2012); Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests.
LLC v. ABM Donuts, Inc., No. CA 11-270 S, 2011 WL 6026129, at *6–7 (D.R.I. Oct. 4,
2011) (finding irreparable injury regardless of whether presumption still applies).
66
Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Wometco Donas Inc., No. 14-10162NMG, 2014 WL 4542956, at *7–8 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2014).
67
Greene v. Ablon, No. 09-10937-DJC, 2013 WL 4714344, at *2–3 (D. Mass. Aug. 28,
2013).
68
Operation ABLE of Greater Boston, Inc. v. Nat’l Able Network, Inc., 646 F. Supp.
2d 166, 176–77 (D. Mass. 2009) (limiting eBay to “permanent injunctions issued under
the Patent Act” and noting that the First Circuit has not indicated that the presumption
does not apply in trademark cases).
69
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, 213 Fed. App’x 654, 655–57 (10th Cir. 2007)
(declining to consider how eBay affects the trademark irreparable harm presumption).
70
Basis Int’l Ltd. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1310, 1310 n.5
(D.N.M. 2011) (noting that eBay does not change the presumption of irreparable harm
because unlike patent cases, “trademark cases involve intangibles like the trademark
owner’s reputation and goodwill”).
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the presumption of irreparable harm, without discussing its continuing validity.71 Some dodge the question by deciding that regardless
of its validity, plaintiff met its burden to show irreparable harm.72
Other district courts decline to apply it in light of eBay.73
c) Circuits Endorsing Use of a Presumption After eBay
(Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits)
Neither the Fourth, Fifth, nor Sixth Circuit has issued an opinion directly analyzing and affirming the propriety of a presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases following eBay. Yet, in
different ways, each has given some form of approval to its continued application.
Of all the Circuits, the Sixth comes closest to preserving, after
eBay, a rule of law that presumes irreparable harm to flow from a
finding of likely confusion. In three separate opinions subsequent
to eBay the Sixth Circuit has relied upon the presumption or its
equivalent to find irreparable harm to support a plaintiff’s entitlement to injunctive relief against a trademark infringer.74 In one
71

See, e.g., Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Med. Prods., No. 1:10-cv-00207-DN, 2012
WL 3962737, at *4–5 (D. Utah Sept. 11, 2012) (listing the four equitable factors from eBay
and stating that trademark infringement carries a presumption of irreparable harm).
72
See, e.g., IHOP Franchising, LLC v. Tabel, No. 13-2641-KHV-TJJ, 2014 WL
1767199, at *11 (D. Kan. Apr. 15, 2014) (noting open question as to continuing validity of
the presumption of irreparable injury, and holding that in any event Plaintiffs had
presented sufficient evidence of irreparable harm, even without the presumption); Steak
n Shake Enters., Inc v. Globex Co., No. 13-cv-01751-RM-CBS, 2013 WL 4718757, at *14
(D. Colo. Sept. 3, 2013).
73
See, e.g., As Am. As Doughnuts, Inc. v. Patton, Nos. 2:10-cv-1138 CW, 2:11-cv-241
CW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135758, at *3 (D. Utah Nov. 22, 2011) (stating, after eBay,
that trademark “infringement alone is not irreparable harm”); Greenway Univ., Inc. v.
Greenway of Ariz., LLC, No. 11-cv-01055-CMA-KLM, 2011 WL 2669174, at *5–6 (D.
Colo. July 7, 2011) (declining to apply a presumption of irreparable injury in light of eBay).
74
See, e.g., CFE Racing Prods., Inc. v. BMF Wheels, Inc., 2015 WL 4174649, at *18
(6th Cir. July 13, 2015) (observing that irreparable harm exists in a trademark case where a
party shows that it will lose control of its reputation; remanding to district court to
increase scope of injunction); Lucky’s Detroit, LLC v. Double L, Inc., 533 F. App’x 553,
555, 560 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming grant of permanent injunction, and concluding that
“there is sufficient evidence that customers will be confused by both parties’ use of the
marks, and thus Double L made a sufficient showing that it would suffer irreparable harm
if LD continues to use the mark”); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc.,
453 F.3d 377, 381–82 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating just two weeks after eBay that “our Circuit
requires no particular finding of its likelihood [of irreparable harm] to support injunctive
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case, in the very next sentence after recitation of the eBay factors
the Court cites to the leading pre-eBay presumption case in the
Sixth Circuit, stating, “In trademark infringement cases, a likelihood of confusion or possible risk to the requesting party’s reputation satisfies the irreparable injury requirement.”75
District courts within the Sixth Circuit seem by and large to
have gotten the message that the presumption of irreparable harm
remains alive and well there. These courts generally cite to the
eBay factors for the overall test used to determine the propriety of
injunctive relief, and then proceed to find the irreparable injury
element presumptively satisfied by trademark infringement itself.76
One court, after remarking that the Sixth Circuit does not require a
showing of irreparable harm to support injunctive relief in trademark cases, supported the irreparable harm element with other
evidence in any event.77 In two cases, the defendants had argued
that eBay necessitated disposing of the presumption in trademark
cases; in both, the courts did not rule on the continued vitality of

relief in cases of this type, for ‘irreparable injury “ordinarily follows when a likelihood of
confusion or possible risk to reputation appears” from infringement or unfair
competition’”).
75
Lucky’s, 533 F. App’x at 555 (citing Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d
595, 608 (6th Cir. 1991)). Two other cases from the Sixth Circuit are consistent with use
of presumptions in finding irreparable harm, but remain more or less silent on the issue.
See L.F.P.IP, LLC v. Hustler Cincinnati, Inc., 533 F. App’x 615, 621 (6th Cir. 2013)
(citing eBay factors and stating without elaboration that “[t]he district court’s injunction
appropriately enjoined Jimmy’s practice of willfully infringing Larry’s trademarks and
protected the public from confusion arising from his use of the marks”); Audi AG v.
D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing eBay factors and holding that
irreparable injury flows from consumers purchasing counterfeit goods).
76
See, e.g., Boost Worldwide, Inc. v. Cell Station Wireless, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-490,
2014 WL 47977, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2014) (granting permanent injunction in
trademark infringement action, and finding eBay’s irreparable injury requirement satisfied
under pre-eBay presumption); Elcometer, Inc. v. TQC-USA, Inc., No. 12-CV-14628,
2013 WL 5346382, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 23, 2013) (granting permanent injunction in
trademark infringement action and finding eBay’s irreparable injury requirement satisfied
by un-rebutted allegation that “unauthorized use of [plaintiff’s] trademark has resulted in
irreparable injury to [plaintiff] and the goodwill associated with its trademark”).
77
End Prod. Results, LLC v. Dental USA, Inc., No. 12-11546, 2014 WL 897363, at *6
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2014) (citing Lorillard Tobacco for proposition that Sixth Circuit does
not require irreparable harm to support injunctive relief, and alternatively reciting
evidence of potential lost sales and customers as support for irreparable harm).

2016]

TRADEMARK’S EBAY PROBLEM

645

the presumption, but instead found or failed to find irreparable
harm on other grounds.78
The Fourth Circuit, for its part, issued indirect support of the
application of the presumption in reviewing the opinion of a district
court that had cited the four-factor test from eBay, but also had
clearly applied the presumption to satisfy the irreparable harm
prong of that test.79 The majority vacated the injunction, but solely
in order to limit its scope to the Fourth Circuit under principals of
comity.80 A concurring and dissenting judge on the panel (who
would have left the injunction in place nationally) observed that the
district court applied the “proper legal test” under eBay, a point
which that judge understood not to be challenged by the majority
opinion.81
District courts in the Fourth Circuit have split on the continued
viability of the presumption. A number still apply it, usually to satisfy the irreparable harm prong of the eBay test.82 Some note a tension caused by eBay, but apply the presumption anyways.83 Others
78

Pond Guy, Inc. v. Aquascape Designs, Inc., No. 13-13229, 2014 WL 2863871, at *13
(E.D. Mich. June 24, 2014) (denying motion for preliminary injunction due to no
likelihood of confusion, and mentioning without deciding defendant’s argument that eBay
rejected the presumption of irreparable harm).
79
Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Von Drehle Corp., No. 5:05-CV-478-BO,
2013 WL 3923984, at *1 (E.D.N.C. July 29, 2013) (presuming irreparable injury upon
showing of confusion), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 781 F.3d 710, 717 (4th Cir. 2015)
(vacating injunction solely to limit its geographical reach under comity principals).
80
Georgia-Pacific, 781 F.3d at 717.
81
Id. at 727–28 (Shedd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The same judge
also approvingly cited the pre-eBay case Lone Star Steakhouse, a leading pro-trademark
presumption case in that circuit, asserting that “[w]hen trademark infringement has been
proven, ‘an injunction is the preferred remedy to insure that future violations will not
occur.’” Id. at 727 (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43
F.3d 922, 939 (4th Cir. 1995)). The circuit’s only other consideration of eBay in the
context of the Lanham Act involved a false advertising case. See PBM Prods., LLC v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 126–27 (4th Cir. 2011).
82
Djarum v. Dhanraj Imports, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (citing
eBay, but applying presumption to satisfy irreparable injury prong); see also Meineke Car
Care Centers, LLC v. ASAR Inc., No. 3:14-CV-129-RJC, 2014 WL 3952491, at *4
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 13, 2014); Portfolio Recovery Associates, Inc. v. Portfolio Recovery
Grp., LLC, No. 2:12CV649, 2013 WL 5723869, at *10 (E.D. Va. Oct. 18, 2013) (noting
that “irreparable injury regularly follows from trademark infringement” (quoting Lone
Star Steakhouse, 43 F.3d at 939)).
83
See, e.g., Reynolds Consumer Prods., Inc. v. Handi-Foil Corp, No. 1:13-CV-214,
2014 WL 3615853, at *12 (E.D.Va. July 18, 2014) (noting that eBay might call the
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cite eBay and eschew mention of a presumption, but nonetheless
engage in a short-cut analysis using the fact of likely confusion and
potential harm to reputation to meet the irreparable injury requirement.84
The Fifth Circuit poses particular challenges. On the one hand,
the circuit has observed that it “avoided expressly adopting” any
presumption of irreparable harm even prior to eBay.85 Under that
logic, one would assume that the circuit would fall in line rather
easily with those that have abrogated the presumption. Instead,
however, the one appellate court to directly rule on the issue, in
Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, actually cited eBay but then endorsed
the pre-eBay position of Professor McCarthy: “All that must be
proven to establish liability and the need for an injunction against
infringement is the likelihood of confusion—injury is presumed.”86
Although the case involved an admittedly esoteric issue of the burden of proving entitlement to a trademark injunction when faced
with a strong laches defense, it still seems fair to conclude that the
Fifth Circuit amazingly went from having no presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement actions prior to eBay to
adopting a presumption that likely confusion is injurious after it.87
District courts in the Fifth Circuit have struggled with how to
adopt the circuit court’s guidance. Some have read the Abraham
case to limit eBay’s ban on presumptions to patent actions, and instead to adopt a rule that a showing of likely confusion allows a
plaintiff to presume irreparable injury for purposes of meeting the

presumption into question, but observing that courts in the Fourth Circuit have
continued generally to find irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of confusion).
84
Ledo Pizza Sys., Inc. v. Singh, No. WDQ-13-2365, 2014 WL 3810524, at *10 (D. Md.
July 31, 2014) (finding irreparable harm from continued use of mark by holdover licensee
without relying on a presumption); Legacy Inv. & Mgmt., LLC v. Susquehanna Bank, No.
CIV. WDQ-12-2877, 2014 WL 836077, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2014) (noting that
irreparable injury regularly flows from trademark infringement, and citing Lone Star
Steakhouse but not citing a presumption).
85
Paulsson Geophysical Servs. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (declining
to address whether a presumption should be allowed after eBay where the facts supported
a finding of irreparable harm regardless).
86
Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 627 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 5
MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:2).
87
Abraham, 708 F.3d at 626–27.
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first prong of the eBay test.88 Others approach the issue a bit more
cautiously by applying a presumption in effect without actually using the term.89 One court reached in the other direction, and refused to apply any presumption under the Fifth Circuit’s earlier
statement that it intentionally avoided doing so.90 Still others note
the existence of the presumption, but find no irreparable harm for
other reasons or support the finding of irreparable harm with other
evidence.91
d) Circuits that Have Not Directly Addressed the
Applicability of eBay to Trademark Law but Where
District Courts Have Attempted to Do So (Second,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits)
Neither the Second, Seventh, nor Eighth Circuit has directly
addressed eBay’s application to trademark law. Of these three, the
Second Circuit has come closest to doing so, in a leading copyright
preliminary injunction opinion Salinger v. Colting, penned by Judge
Calabresi.92 There the court observed, in dicta, that it could “see
no reason” why eBay’s “central lesson” (i.e., that a court deciding
88

S. Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., No. CIV.A. 06-9170, 2014 WL
1652436, at *9 (E.D. La. Apr. 24, 2014) (presuming irreparable harm from showing of
likelihood of confusion); see also Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
CIV.A. 4:14-0941, 2015 WL 1034254, at *21 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015) (“The Fifth
Circuit has signaled that presumptions of irreparable injury are still appropriate following
the Supreme Court’s eBay decision.”).
89
Namer v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. CIV.A. 12-2232, 2014 WL 5780539, at *19
(E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2014) (granting injunctive relief as “usual and standard remedy once
trademark infringement has been found” without using the term presumption after citing
eBay); Christus Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Am. Consultants RX, Inc., No. SA:12-CV-1221DAE, 2014 WL 1092096, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2014) (recognizing that in the Fifth
Circuit injuries to reputation and goodwill are considered irreparable, but avoiding use of
the term “presumption” after citing eBay).
90
Premiere Hot Tubs, Inc. v. A-Tex Family Fun Ctr., Inc., No. A-12-CA-824-SS, 2014
WL 1666341, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2014) (finding no irreparable injury, and denying
injunction, despite proof of underlying infringement).
91
Reservoir, Inc. v. Truesdell, 1 F. Supp. 3d 598, 616–17 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2014)
(finding no irreparable harm despite presumption where defendants had voluntarily
ceased use of the plaintiff’s marks); Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667,
680 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that “likelihood of confusion can constitute irreparable
harm in a trademark case,” but engaging in independent analysis of irreparable harm in
counterfeiting action).
92
607 F.3d 68, 78–80 (2d Cir. 2010).
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whether to issue an injunction must not “presume that a party has
met an element of the injunction standard”) would “not apply with
equal force to an injunction in any type of case.”93 Nevertheless,
successor panels have resisted fully adopting this position in
trademark cases where not necessary for the holding.94
The lack of direct appellate guidance has not prevented district
courts in the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits from staking
out a range of (often contradictory) positions on the applicability of
eBay to trademark law. In the Second Circuit, many lower courts
understand the (non-binding) Salinger opinion effectively to prohibit the use of presumptions of irreparable harm in trademark injunction practice.95 Some courts, citing to Salinger and eBay for the
rule that irreparable injury cannot be presumed, work around this
by stating (contrary to the Ninth Circuit view) that showing a loss
of control over the reputation of a mark can establish irreparable
injury.96 Some note that Salinger and eBay call into question the
93

Id. at 78 n.7. In Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, the Seventh Circuit similarly held that,
although eBay was a case about patents rather than copyrights and about permanent
rather than preliminary injunctions, it was persuaded by Flexible Lifeline Systems, Inc. v.
Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 995–96, 998 (9th Cir. 2011), and Salinger v. Colting, 607
F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2010), that eBay governs a motion for a preliminary injunction in a
copyright case, as well. Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012).
94
Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895–97 (2d Cir. 2015)
(citing Salinger standard in breach of trademark license suit and affirming finding of
irreparable harm based on underlying facts without discussion of a presumption); U.S.
Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 511 F. App’x 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2013) (declining
to decide whether a presumption of irreparable harm can apply after eBay in a trademark
infringement context where district court found irreparable harm without applying a
presumption).
95
See, e.g., Ann Clark, Ltd. v. R&M Int’l, Corp., No. 1:14-CV-143, 2014 WL 7392026,
at *3 (D. Vt. Dec. 29, 2014) (“The presumption of irreparable injury when likelihood of
confusion is shown is no longer in effect after Salinger.” (quoting Marks Org., Inc. v.
Joles, 784 F. Supp. 2d 322, 334 (S.D.N.Y.2011))); Balady, Inc. v. Elhindi, No. 14 CV 855
SJ RER, 2014 WL 7342867, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (“[F]ollowing Salinger,
courts have found that ‘th[is] presumption of irreparable injury in trademark cases is no
longer appropriate.’” (quoting U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F.
Supp. 2d 515, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2011))); Krevat v. Burgers to Go, Inc., No. 13-CV-6258 JS
AKT, 2014 WL 4638844, at *12–13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (citing Salinger for rule
that irreparable harm may no longer be presumed in a trademark infringement action, and
finding irreparable harm on the facts of the case); Mister Softee, Inc. v. Tsirkos, No. 14
CIV. 1975 LTS RLE, 2014 WL 2535114, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014).
96
See, e.g., NYP Holdings v. New York Post Pub. Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 328, 341
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“‘[I]rreparable harm exists in a trademark case when the party seeking
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presumption’s continuing vitality, but establish irreparable harm
with other evidence in the record.97 It appears that the majority of
district courts in the Second Circuit, however, are still applying the
presumption without regard to any tension created by eBay or Salinger.98 One court went so far as to cite the Salinger case for the
proposition that eBay applies with equal force to trademark cases,
but then immediately went on to observe that irreparable harm “is
automatically satisfied by [plaintiff] prevailing on its trademark
claim.”99
In the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, many district courts reference and analyze the four factors from the eBay decision, but nevertheless apply the presumption of irreparable harm without addressing its validity.100 Some apply the four-factor test from eBay
the injunction shows that it will lose control over the reputation of its
trademark . . . because loss of control over one’s reputation is neither “calculable nor
precisely compensable.”’ Thus, it will often be the case that a party’s demonstration of a
likelihood of success on a trademark claim will also show a threat of irreparable harm.”
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Mrs. U.S. Nat’l Pageant, Inc. v. Miss U.S. Org.,
LLC, 875 F. Supp. 2d 211, 226–27 (W.D.N.Y. 2012))); Mitchell Grp. USA LLC v. Nkem
Udeh, No. 14-cv-5745, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143001, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2007)
(reading Salinger to bar presumptions of irreparable harm, but nevertheless finding
irreparable harm in counterfeiting action from loss of control over reputation).
97
See, e.g., Barefoot Contessa Pantry, LLC v. Aqua Star (USA) Co., No. 15-CV-1092
JMF, 2015 WL 845711, at *3, *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2015) (observing, without
deciding, open question as to eBay’s applicability to trademark presumptions after
Salinger, and relying on, inter alia, evidence of overlapping markets to find irreparable
harm).
98
See, e.g., Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., No. 12 CIV.6065 PAE, 2015 WL
736029, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2015) (citing Salinger but presuming irreparable injury
for trademark infringement based on jury findings of likelihood of consumer confusion);
Lavatec Laundry Tech., GmbH v. Lavatec, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-56 SRU, 2014 WL 6633047,
at *1 (D. Conn. Nov. 21, 2014) (finding irreparable injury established by showing a
likelihood of confusion); Boost Worldwide, Inc. v. Talk Til U Drop Wireless, Inc., No.
5:14-CV-86 MAD/TWD, 2014 WL 5026777, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2014) (likelihood of
consumer confusion sufficient to establish irreparable harm); optionsXpress, Inc. v.
optionsXpress Inc., No. 14-CV-956 PKC, 2014 WL 3728637, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 28,
2014); Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 193, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (noting that the court may presume irreparable harm, and a plaintiff need not prove
it separately, when a likelihood of confusion has been established).
99
Electrolux Home Prods., Inc. v. BuyRite Appliances, LLC, No. 14-CV-2461 ILG
SMG, 2014 WL 5140327, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2014) (emphasis added).
100
See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. 3D Designers Inspirations, No. 4:11-cv-04092-SLD-JEH,
2014 WL 4901683, at *4, *6 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (listing eBay factors and finding
irreparable injury prong satisfied because trademark infringement harms “are by their
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without mention of presumptions, instead citing potential harm to
goodwill or loss of control of the trademark as evidence of irreparable harm.101 Others cite to the presumption of irreparable harm,
question its continuing vitality after eBay, but cautiously proceed to
find irreparable harm from that same potential harm to goodwill
and loss of control over the mark (seemingly using the presumption
as a finger on the scale for plaintiff even if technically no longer
good law).102 Still others register serious doubts as to presumption’s force after eBay, but hold for defendant on other grounds
(e.g., due to delay in bringing suit, balance of the harms in defendant’s favor, and other factors).103 Many district courts simply prevery nature irreparable and not susceptible of adequate measurement for remedy at law”
(quoting Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th
Cir.1982))); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Nutraceutical Corp., No. 11-C-861, 2014 WL
4267445, at *18–19 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2014) (listing eBay factors and applying “well
settled” presumption that Lanham Act violations are presumed irreparable); Epic Sys.
Corp. v. Silver, No. 13-CV-355-WMC, 2014 WL 2694051, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis. June 12,
2014) (listing eBay factors, applying presumption of irreparable harm, and further
concluding that other eBay factors are met by infringement alone).
101
See, e.g., C&N Corp. v. Kane, No. 12-C-0257, 2013 WL 6001074, at *2 (E.D. Wis.
Nov. 12, 2013) (analyzing injunction under eBay factors and finding irreparable injury
from damage to goodwill and loss of control of trademark without express mention of a
presumption); Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 880–81 (D.
Minn. 2010); Am. Taxi Dispatch, Inc. v. Am. Metro Taxi & Limo Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d
999, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
102
See, e.g., Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc. v. Brown Health Relaxation Station LLC, No. 13-C575, 2014 WL 1818154, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 2014) (“While that presumption may
no longer be valid, the difficulty in assessing the damages associated with the harm to
Zeltiq’s reputation and loss of goodwill supports a finding that Zeltiq has sustained
irreparable harm.”); Buffalo Wild Wings Int’l, Inc. v. Grand Canyon Equity, LLC, 829 F.
Supp. 2d 836, 845–46 & n.6 (D. Minn. 2011) (questioning presumption after eBay and
granting motion for preliminary injunction based on assertions of loss of control in
holdover franchisee context); Gold’s Gym Licensing, LLC v. K-Pro Mktg. Grp., Inc., No.
09-CV-1211 (PJS/RLE), 2009 WL 2253247, at *2–3 (D. Minn. July 28, 2009)
(questioning presumption, but ultimately applying it because (1) trademarks represent a
type of intangible asset, the loss of which can create irreparable harm, and (2) the
defendant failed to oppose the motion and argue that no presumption should apply).
103
See, e.g., Plasti Dip Int’l Inc. v. Rust-Oleum Brands Co., No. 14-1831 (JRT/SER),
2014 WL 7183789, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2014) (finding persuasive the Third and
Ninth Circuit view that eBay overrode the presumption of irreparable harm but not
reaching such a holding, and denying motion for preliminary injunction on other grounds
including as balance of harms favoring defendant); Real-Time Reporters. P.C. v. Sonntag
Reporting Servs., No. 13 C 5348, 2013 WL 5818460, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2013)
(questioning whether the presumption or irreparable harm is valid in light of eBay, but
finding the point moot because plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit would overcome the
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sume irreparable harm without mention of eBay.104 One court cited
eBay for the principal that patentees can no longer presume irreparable harm from showing a likelihood of success on the merits,
but then went on to indicate (in dicta and without other explanation) that a showing of likely confusion would still entitle a trademark plaintiff to a presumption of irreparable harm.105
e) The Empirical Evidence Reveals No Decrease in
Trademark Injunction Win Rates After eBay
Perhaps not surprising considering all the doctrinal confusion it
has created, the empirical evidence suggests that trademark injunction win rates at the federal district courts do not conform to predictable patterns after eBay. One might have hypothesized, for instance, that both preliminary and permanent trademark injunction
win rates would decline after courts had enough time to assimilate
eBay into trademark law. After all, while some courts have rejected
eBay as inapplicable to trademark law, those courts should not really experience any shift in trademark injunction grant rates. They
essentially kept pre-eBay case law in place. Others, however, have
adopted it, which should doctrinally make injunctions more difficult to attain in those regions. Putting this all together, it would
suggest at least some downward pressure nationally on trademark
injunction win rates.
But the data hardly bear that out. If anything, in fact, trademark
injunction win rates for prevailing, classic trademark infringement
plaintiffs have increased slightly overall in the post-eBay world. In
particular, while win rates for prevailing trademark infringement
presumption regardless); City Cycle IP, LLC v. Caztek, Inc., No. 12-1285 (JNE/SER),
2012 WL 3656443, at *3–4 n.6 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2012) (acknowledging that it is not
clear whether a presumption of irreparable harm from trademark infringement still exists
after eBay, but denying motion for preliminary injunction where defendants had already
ceased use of accused infringing marks).
104
See, e.g., George & Co., LLC v. Xavier Enters., Inc., Civ. No. 09-2973, 2009 WL
4730331, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2009) (presuming irreparable harm on trademarkinfringement claim where plaintiffs demonstrated a showing of likelihood of confusion); J
& B Wholesale Distrib., Inc. v. Redux Beverages, LLC, 621 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 (D.
Minn. 2007).
105
Medtronic, Inc. v. Brasseler USA, Inc., No. 13 C 5348, 2011 WL 4899980, at *3–4
(D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2011) (denying presumption of irreparable harm for trademark
infringement because plaintiff could not establish likely confusion).
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plaintiffs seeking a permanent injunction have declined just slightly
in the last decade, this decline is dwarfed by a substantial increase in
win rates for trademark infringement plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction.
According to the Darts-ip platform, for the three years prior to
eBay, prevailing trademark infringement plaintiffs in the federal
district courts (i.e., those for whom likelihood of confusion had
been found in a claim of trademark infringement) went on to receive a preliminary injunction in about fifty-three percent of cases,
and a permanent injunction ninety-five percent of the time, for a
combined win rate of about sixty-eight percent.106 An analogous
report for a recent three year period (May 15, 2012–May 15, 2015),
by contrast, reveals that plaintiffs in the same position received a
preliminary injunction about sixty-four percent of the time, and a
permanent injunction ninety-three percent of the time, for a combined win rate of about seventy-nine percent.107
In other words, while win rates for those seeking permanent injunctions against the use of a confusingly similar mark declined by
about two percent after eBay, preliminary injunction movants saw
about an eleven percent increase in the rate at which they were
granted injunctions against trademark infringement.108
f) A Note on Preliminary Versus Permanent Injunctive
Relief
In concluding this review of the post-eBay muddle, it is worth
highlighting one distinction not focused on by any circuit court to
date. Namely, none of the appellate courts considering whether to
apply eBay to trademark law have distinguished materially between
106

See Search Performed Using Darts-ip (on file with author). The 2003–2006 data set
identified sixty-seven cases in this timeframe where a preliminary injunction was
considered where confusion had been found in a “standard/classic” trademark
infringement claim, and thirty-nine cases for a permanent injunction. Id. Darts-ip does
not consider trade dress infringement or dilution in its category of “standard/classic”
trademark infringement. The database includes both published and unpublished cases.
107
Id. Based on the same criteria, the 2012–2015 data set identified eighty-nine cases in
this timeframe where a preliminary injunction was considered where confusion had been
found in a “standard/classic” trademark infringement claim, and 103 cases for a
permanent injunction. Id.
108
Id.
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preliminary and permanent relief. Rather, the Ninth Circuit’s approach is typical, where it held that what applies in the permanent
injunction context applies “with equal force” in preliminary injunction practice.109 This follows the general tendency among posteBay and Winter federal courts to more or less ignore the distinction for purposes of eliminating presumptions.110
For many remedies scholars, however, the distinction between
requests for preliminary relief before the merits of a suit have been
determined, and permanent relief after, is vast and critical.111 This
holds especially true in the realm of statutory injunctions,112 where
Congress may have meant to provide a presumptive entitlement to
an injunction to enforce a statutory right after a determination on
the merits, but not intended to disrupt any provisional relief practices.113 It is far more problematic, for instance, to place a burden of
production on a defendant one week after a complaint has been
filed than one week after a full trial on the merits following on years
of discovery.114

109

Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013).
See supra note 14.
111
See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 27, at 692 (“Preliminary relief is best considered as a
separate issue, only distantly related to the choice of remedy at final judgment.”).
112
See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
113
Remedies scholars generally recommend against mechanically applying rules
designed for permanent injunctions to preliminary ones, particularly in the realm of
injunctions authorized by statute (i.e., those at issue in eBay and the Lanham Act). See,
e.g., DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 246 (criticizing rules “spread without much thought”
from permanent to provisional injunction cases). Dobbs explains:
It is quite doubtful that a statute authorizing injunctions without
irreparable harm is also intended to authorize a lunch-time restraining
order without a showing of irreparable harm. The adequacy or
irreparable harm rules serves a very different purpose in preliminary
injunction and TRO cases. In those cases it guards against serious loss
due to an inadequate hearing.
Id.
114
Cf. Anthony DiSarro, Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the
Substantive Principals of Preliminary Injunctions, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 51, 52–53 (2012)
(highlighting ways in which preliminary injunction practice can be “terribly unfair to
defendants”).
110
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C. eBay in the Eyes of Commentators
1. Responses in the Trademark Community
Commentators associated with the everyday practice of trademark law, including Professor McCarthy and practicing attorneys,
generally protest against extending eBay to trademark law. Writing
in 2009, for instance, McCarthy attacked eBay’s applicability to
plaintiff’s entitlement to preliminary trademark injunctions.115 Unlike in patent and copyright law, in the trademark realm “once a
probability of proving likelihood of confusion is shown, the trademark owner’s business goodwill and reputation are in jeopardy . . .
the plaintiff’s reputation is in the hands of the defendant.”116
Moreover, the presumption was always rebuttable and never absolute, thus leaving room for (in his view) the exceptional case where
irreparable harm does not follow from likely confusion.117 In sum,
“Like trying to un-ring a bell, trying to use dollars to ‘compensate’
after the fact for damage to business goodwill and reputation cannot constitute fair or full compensation. Damage to business reputation and good will is inherently ‘irreparable.’”118
A team of franchise and related law practitioners offer a variation on this theme, which might be thought of as the distinctionwithout-a-difference view.119 Upon review of a range of trademark
115

McCarthy, supra note 36, at 1, 4; see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:47.70 (“I
do not believe that the presumption of irreparable injury traditionally followed in
trademark preliminary injunction cases is in any way inconsistent with the letter or the
spirit of the Supreme Court’s eBay decision.”).
116
McCarthy, supra note 36, at 1, 4.
117
Id.
118
Id. This view is largely in accord with that of other commentators. See, e.g., David H.
Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions After eBay, 99
TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1037 (2009) (“eBay should not be used to eviscerate the normal
presumption of irreparable harm that attaches upon a showing of liability in trademark
cases. . . . [T]he rationales underlying trademark protection[s] are sufficiently distinct
from those motivating patent and copyright protections . . . .”); Jeffrey M. Sanchez,
Comment, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the Presumption of Irreparable Harm
in Trademark Law Will Survive eBay and Winter, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 555–65
(concluding, under similar reasoning, that the presumption of irreparable harm should
and will survive in trademark cases post-eBay).
119
See Ronald T. Coleman, Trishanda L. Treadwell & Elizabeth A. Lloyd, Applicability
of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay, 32-SUM FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 11 (Summer
2012).
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and franchise cases in which district courts struggled to accommodate eBay under a consistent theory, the authors conclude that regardless of whether courts discontinue application of a “formal”
presumption after eBay, the case “should not fundamentally alter
the outcome” in most injunction suits.120 This is because, in practice, “the same evidence showing success on the merits will often
support a finding of irreparable harm.”121
2. Other Scholarly Responses See Differing Roles for eBay in
Trademark Law
A more nuanced academic view comes from Professor Sandra
Rierson.122 In a piece penned just a few years after eBay, Rierson
effectively agrees with McCarthy’s position that a presumption of
irreparable harm still makes intuitive sense in a “traditional” infringement case, such as where defendant “passes-off” its goods as
those of plaintiff.123 She draws a distinction, however, between
such cases and what she refers to as “propertized version[s] of
trademark law,”124 where application of eBay might have value in
the trademark arena.125 It may be better to be cautious and eschew
120

Id.
Id. Along these lines, a number of trade pieces written in the wake of eBay advise
trademark litigants to take a belt-and-suspenders approach. They generally note
substantial uncertainty as to whether and how eBay will be applied in trademark cases,
and then advise trademark plaintiffs to submit evidence supporting assertions of harm to
protect them in the event that the court declines to give the traditional presumption. See,
e.g., Steven J. Barber, Presumption of Irreparable Harm: An Analysis of Developments After
eBay, ASPATORE, 2009 WL 3358959, at *8 (Oct. 2009); Jonathan Hudis et al., Why
Trademark and Copyright Counsel Should Heed the Patent Precedent of the Supreme Court, 2
LANDSLIDE 15, 18 (2009); Rita W. Siamas, Whatever “It” Is, You Can Find it In Cases
Post-eBay: But Don’t Search for Guidance About Whether eBay Eliminates the Presumption of
Irreparable Harm in Trademark Infringement Cases, 50-AUG ORANGE COUNTY LAW 18, 23
(2008). This is consistent with the distinction-without-a-difference view that the same
result should attain with or without a presumption (just with an extra step of resubmitting, at the remedy stage, the evidence already establishing likelihood of
confusion).
122
See generally Sandra Rierson, IP Remedies After eBay: Assessing the Impact on
Trademark Law, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 163 (2008).
123
Id. at 165.
124
Id. For a discussion of trademark propertization generally, see Peter J. Karol, The
Constitutional Limitation on Trademark Propertization, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1065, 1069–
75 (2015).
125
Rierson, supra note 122, at 165.
121
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presumptions where the theory of trademark liability is premised
on newer, less generally accepted, and more de minims types of
confusion and trademark harm, such as post-sale and initial interest
confusion,126 and dilution.127
Some scholars have supported a more or less total extension of
eBay to other fields, including trademark law.128 In an article approaching eBay from a general remedies perspective, for instance,
Anthony DiSarro concludes that, at least in a preliminary injunction context, the eBay approach is fairer to defendants because otherwise they are “being precluded from doing something even
though there has been no adjudication that such conduct is unlawful.”129 Authors such as DiSarro focus primarily on the procedural
unfairness of preliminary injunction motions across all types of
federal cases, citing plaintiffs’ unilateral control over the timing of
the motion and related expedited discovery, the pressure on defendants to defend cases while still investigating the facts, and the misuse of preliminary injunctions as a “platform for future threats of
contempt” to drive settlement.130
Such arguments, though convincing within their sphere, seem
more of an attack on the procedural device of preliminary injunction motions and have little to say about the internal logic of trademark law. At a minimum, they have almost no applicability to permanent trademark injunctions issued after liability has definitively
been confirmed on the merits (the posture of the eBay case itself).131

126

Id. at 181. Bernstein takes direct issue with this approach, suggesting that if the
problem is a doubtful theory of liability, then the solution should be to recast or overturn
the theory of liability and not to tinker with remedies. Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 118,
at 1069 (“Expanding eBay to trademark law to minimize the consequences of questionable
decision-making exacerbates bad law by creating even worse law.”).
127
Rierson, supra note 122, at 183–84.
128
See, e.g., DiSarro, supra note 114, at 84 n.194, 97 (2012) (approvingly characterizing
the Eleventh Circuit as “intimating” in the North American Medical case that eBay should
bar presumptions of irreparable harm).
129
Id. at 97.
130
Id. at 53.
131
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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3. The Property Versus Liability Rules Literature
Focusing its attention on the patent or copyright spaces, the
community of intellectual property scholars focused on whether
property (i.e., injunction-based) or liability (i.e., damages-based)
rules regimes should govern protections for intangible property has
remained relatively silent on the trademark front after eBay.132
Mark Lemley and Philip Weiser, for instance, do not mention
trademarks in their post-eBay work on the subject.133 Similarly, articles focused on the scope of injunctive relief, or the conceptual
relationship between intellectual property rights and infringement
remedies, after eBay tend to take patent or copyright infringement
as their centerpieces (often ignoring trademark law entirely).134
While a number of respected law and economics scholars
tackled trademark issues before eBay was decided, their pieces
tended to focus (naturally, given the law at the time) on the question of liability for trademark infringement rather than a court’s
remedial options, effectively assuming that a finding of trademark
infringement meant that defendant had to desist use.135 Professor
Richard Epstein remains a notable exception to this trend. He specifically analyzed the fit between trademark law and real property
rules both before, and then again after eBay, concluding in both

132

For a general discussion of the property versus liability rules debate see Henry E.
Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004). The seminal article in
this arena has long been Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
133
Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007).
134
See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, The Conceptual Relationship Between IP Rights and
Infringement Remedies, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825, 827, 829, 850–63 (2015) (analyzing
conceptual relationship between patent and copyright, but not trademark, rights and
remedies); John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) Than “Off-Switches”: PatentInfringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2012).
135
See, e.g., William Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J. LAW ECON. 265, 300–06 (1987) (focusing analysis on when and why
likely confusion and infringement are found in trademark law, and assuming the grant of
an exclusive right in such a case, rather than on when and why the remedy of an
injunction is given as a remedy); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY
L.J. 367, 391–95 (1999) (equating expansions in likelihood of confusion standard to
expansions in exclusive rights of use).
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cases that the rules governing trademarks should parallel those governing real property.136
4. Trademark Infringement as Trespass or Nuisance?
Moving along the tracks laid by Professor Epstein, one reductive but potentially useful way to frame a future property/liability
rules inquiry in the trademark space would be to ask whether
trademark infringement is more conceptually akin to real property
trespass (the archetypal property rule regime) or nuisance (a fluid
doctrine associated with more remedial flexibility).137
On one hand, it might seem closer to the former in that the
trademark right is designed to put control of a valued and socially
useful resource (the trademark) in the hands of only one person or
entity so as to assure that the resource is consistently and efficiently maintained. Like physical resources, trademarks can lose their
value rapidly when exposed to multiple incompatible uses—
centralized control by a single actor is fundamental to the system.138

136

See Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 484–86 (2010) [hereinafter
Epstein, Disintegration] (observing, after eBay, that trademark law “better comport[s]
with the libertarian model of property” than even patent and copyright, and generally
asserting that the rules of infringement and exclusion for intellectual property should
parallel those for trespass in real property (citing Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property:
Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L. J. 803, 827 (2001) (“For trade names and
trademarks the land model carries over without a hitch.”))). In both cases, the key to
Epstein’s argument is that trademarks, like real property, are given an indefinite duration
for good reason. Putting a strong brand into the public domain destroys its sourceassociative function, and thus its value, without any offsetting benefit to rivals or the
public. Thus, like real property, trademarks best keep their value in private hands, and are
appropriately not subject to “arbitrary limit(s) on the duration of the interest.” Id. at 484.
Patents and copyrights, by contrast, do enrich the public domain once given over to it,
thus justifying a limit to the term of exclusivity and slightly differentiating their regime of
legal protection from that of real property and trademark law. Id.
137
See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES § 2.2 (6th ed. 2014) (describing hybrid property/liability rule nature of
nuisance remedies). It is, of course, hotly contested whether there is any value or
accuracy in analogizing real to intellectual property. See Epstein, Disintegration, supra
note 136, at 456 (describing debate).
138
Landes & Posner make this trademark/trespass comparison more or less explicitly in
their 1987 article:
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In presumptively granting an injunction against trespass, we
generally avoid asking the real property owner to demonstrate why
her use of her own property is more valuable than the trespasser’s
attempted use of that same property precisely because we believe
the real property regime works best when we defer to the property
owner’s use decisions.139 So too, one might argue, trademark law
prior to eBay presumptively abstained from weighing the relative
value of uses made by the trademark owner and infringer because
the regime was designed to delegate such decisions solely to the
owner.
On the other hand, trademark infringement law might seem a
closer cousin of nuisance than trespass. Nuisance, traditionally understood, involves a non-trespassory invasion of another’s interest
in the private use and enjoyment of land.140 As such, it involves interference with the owner’s use of her property, but not a physical
intrusion onto it.141
So too, we might say, trademark infringement is best understood as an interference with an owner’s trademark resulting from
another’s noninvasive use of a similar mark on its own goods. Like
a nuisance claim, the infringer’s use of a confusingly similar mark
To perform its economizing function a trademark . . . must not be
duplicated. To allow another maker of decaffeinated coffee to sell its
coffee under the name ‘Sanka’ would destroy the benefit of the name
in identifying a brand of decaffeinated coffee made by General
Foods . . . . It would be like allowing a second rancher to graze his
cattle on a pasture the optimal use of which required that only one
herd be allowed to graze.
Landes & Posner, supra note 135, at 269.
139
See Smith, supra note 132, at 1759–60 (“Property law delegates the choice among
these [uses] to the owner, without the need for the law to evaluate or even to specify in
advance what these uses are. When a use falls squarely within this implicitly defined set,
the question is not evaluating use A versus use B, but whether officials are well-placed to
do this first-order decision making at all. Instead, officials can enforce the law’s secondorder decision to delegate the first-order decision to the owner.”).
140
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
141
Id. § 821D cmt. d; see, e.g., Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co.,
817 N.W.2d 693, 704 (Minn. 2012) (“Traditionally, trespasses are distinct from
nuisances: ‘the law of nuisance deals with indirect or intangible interference with an
owner’s use and enjoyment of land, while trespass deals with direct and tangible
interferences with the right to exclusive possession of land.’” (quoting DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 96 (2000))).

660

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:625

on its own goods does not literally prevent the trademark owner
from doing what it was doing before. The infringer is not entering
the plaintiff’s factory and putting its mark on the trademark owner’s t-shirts. Rather, the affixation of a like label to distinct physical
goods causes an indirect harm to plaintiff’s interests (and consumer welfare generally) by creating consumer confusion and a weaker
brand. As such, we are really asking an infringement (like a nuisance) defendant effectively to “internalize the external harms that
its operation causes.”142 Under such a model, we might be more
willing to embrace eBay’s remedial flexibility in trademark law, allowing damages to substitute for injunctive relief as courts sometimes do in nuisance cases.143
II. WHY HAS EBAY POSED SUCH PROBLEMS FOR
TRADEMARK LAW?
Part I of this Article demonstrated the havoc eBay has played
with the law of injunctive relief in trademark infringement cases.
This Part seeks to better understand why eBay has been so hard for
federal courts to assimilate in the trademark space. After discussing
some preliminary considerations, this Article then turns to the statute itself and its legislative history to search for an explanation for
eBay’s challenges. It proposes that courts are struggling to digest
eBay because the Lanham Act is a particularly thorny example of a
well-known and hard problem with statutory injunctions. Namely,
how should a court reconcile a statutory mandate, enforceable by
injunction, with background equitable discretion?
In the Lanham Act’s case, the problem is exacerbated by deep
divisions regarding the underlying purpose of the legislation. In the
push and pull between backers of a new, truly national federal
142

SINGER ET AL., supra note 137, at 377.
For an example of this, of course, one need look no further than the famed (and still
controversial) case Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 228 (1970) (vacating
injunction and instead granting permanent damages in private nuisance suit brought
against polluting cement company by neighboring homeowners). But see Douglas
Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train Wreck in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L. 1, 7, 29–32 (2012) (characterizing Boomer as “a
terrible opinion” and proposing, instead, renewed use of the undue hardship defense in
place of the supposed remedial innovations of Boomer and eBay).
143
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trademark law, and those wishing to subordinate the Lanham Act
to the longstanding primacy of state-based common law trademark
rights, the drafters worked out a compromise. Specifically, the
Lanham Act would grant an exclusive use right to registrants
throughout the entire United States, but the judiciary would retain
discretion over whether and how to enforce it against infringers.
But the drafters failed to give any guidance as to how those competing concerns were to be reconciled, other than by looking to preLanham Act equity practices.
The statutory scheme is further taxed in the Lanham Act’s case
by the extreme difficulty of attaining monetary relief. Uncertainty
in the calibration of the injunctive relief remedy is magnified many
times over by not consistently awarding money damages in the ordinary case of infringement.
A. Preliminary Considerations
1. Debunking the No-Principled-Reason-Not-To Shortcut
Before analyzing the Lanham Act and its history, it is helpful to
dispose of one reflexive argument often made about eBay, and to
place the law of equitable injunctive relief in some context. To begin with, some might consider it obvious that eBay should apply
with equal force to trademark as to patent law. After all, the operative statutory provisions, as the Ninth Circuit observed, use identical language in giving the district courts power to grant injunctions in accordance with “the principles of equity.”144 And both
are forms of what we call intellectual property. Why shouldn’t all
courts just say, along with the First Circuit, “We see no principled
reason why [eBay] should not apply” in a trademark case, and leave
it there?145 Beyond the obvious counterpoint that courts in practice
are wildly inconsistent on this issue (which cuts against any suggestion of an easy answer), there are at least five reasons why what’s

144

See supra notes 41–42.
Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Medical News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 31–
34 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 78 n.7 (observing that “we see
no reason that eBay would not apply with equal force to an injunction in any type of
case”).
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good for patents (and copyrights) cannot simply be equated to
what’s good for trademarks.
First, the entire operating principle behind U.S. trademark law
differs from that of copyright and patent law. Unlike the latter, the
former is not a property interest granted by the government in order to encourage creative activity.146 Trademark law, rather, is a
form of regulation against unfair competition and a means of protecting the integrity of information about products and services in
the consuming marketplace.147 For this reason, the U.S. Congress
is not allowed to regulate trademarks under the U.S. Constitution’s
patent and copyright clause; but rather must resort to the commerce clause for its constitutional authority.148
Second, although concerns about “trademark bullying” do abound these days,149 trademark law has experienced nothing like the
non-practicing entity (i.e., patent troll) phenomenon endemic to
patent law (and which motivated at least some of the justices in deciding eBay itself).150 There are a number of reasons for this,151 but
146

See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879) (“Any attempt, however, to
identify the essential characteristics of a trade-mark with inventions and discoveries in the
arts and sciences, or with the writings of authors, will show that the effort is surrounded
with insurmountable difficulties. The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to
invention or discovery.”); cf. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1993) (“[T]he patent
system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the
public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive
monopoly for a limited period of time.”).
147
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“In principle,
trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduces the
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ for it quickly and easily
assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the
same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the
past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable
product.” (internal citations omitted)).
148
In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93–94 (rejecting the Copyright Clause in the
Constitution as a basis for authority for Congress to regulate trademarks).
149
See generally PARKER HIGGINS, CORYNNE MCSHERRY & DANIEL NAZER, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., WHO HAS YOUR BACK: PROTECTING YOUR SPEECH FROM COPYRIGHT
AND TRADEMARK BULLIES (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.eff.org/files/2014/10/27/whohas-your-back-2014-copyright-trademark_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4X7-2GZU].
150
See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (expressing concern over “firms [that] use patents not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees”).
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a leading one is surely that (unlike patents),152 trademark rights do
not arise upon discovery or invention but only upon actual use.153
Trademark law, that is, requires a bona fide practicing entity before
rights will be enforced.154
Third, as detailed below, monetary relief is far harder to attain
in trademark law than in patent or copyright law. Whereas trademark law generally requires a heightened showing of “actual confusion” just to attain monetary relief,155 patent law statutorily
mandates at least a reasonable royalty as a baseline,156 and copyright law maintains a sophisticated regime of statutory damages.157
This counsels against mechanically extending a remedial rule from
patent or copyright law to trademark law.
Fourth, unlike a claim of patent infringement (which requires
no showing of harm as part of an affirmative case for liability),158
151

See Michael S. Mireles, Trademark Trolls: A Problem in the United States?, 18 CHAP.
L. REV. 815, 827–67 (2015) (offering eight reasons why trademark trolls will not emerge as
a problem in the United States). Mireles includes, among his reasons, the extension of
eBay to trademark law. Id. at 856. However, as discussed throughout Section I.B.2 of this
Article, courts in trademark cases have hardly been universal in adopting eBay.
152
“A patent is granted in exchange for a patentee’s disclosure of an invention, not for
the patentee’s use of the invention. There is no requirement in this country that a
patentee make, use, or sell its patented invention.” Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405, 424–30 (1908)).
153
See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (“[T]he right
grows out of use, not mere adoption.”); Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, 96 F.3d 1217,
1219 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough to have
invented the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership
must have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.”); 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 16:11 (“Unlike patent law, rights in trademarks are not
gained through discovery or invention of the mark, but only through actual usage.”).
154
That entity need not be the mark owner, as use can be substantiated through a
controlled licensee. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2012).
155
See infra Section III.B.
156
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less that a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest
and costs as fixed by the court.” (emphasis added)).
157
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
158
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964) (“[I]t has often and clearly been held that
unauthorized use, without more, constitutes infringement.”).
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trademark infringement claims require plaintiff to show likely confusion in order to prevail in the liability phase.159 Prevailing trademark plaintiffs, unlike patent plaintiffs, have thus already made
some demonstration of likely harm prior to qualifying for a remedy.
Any rule mandating a further showing of harm after the patent infringement liability phase thus needs some added justification in
the trademark infringement context.
Finally, and most abstractly, trademarks are conceptually a far
more conditional form of property interest than patents or copyrights. They are protected not as things in themselves, but for the
goodwill they represent;160 for the commercial magnetism they
have attained, under “the law’s recognition of the psychological
function of symbols.”161 For this reason, trademark rights are only
assertable appurtenant to the goods or services with which they are
used, and unlike patents and copyrights have no legal validity as
rights in gross.162
There may well be sound reasons to extend the rule of eBay to
trademark cases. All of the above “principled” distinctions between trademark law and patent and copyright law, however, counsel strongly against simply waving a hand at the problem by sug159

See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (“Any person who shall . . . use in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant . . . .” (emphasis added));
Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (“To
succeed on a claim of trademark infringement, a plaintiff must establish (1) that its mark is
entitled to trademark protection, and (2) that the allegedly infringing use is likely to cause
consumer confusion.”). This is equally true for infringement of an unregistered mark
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Lanham Act section 43(a)). See, e.g., Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611
F.3d 767, 773 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that the same essential two elements sustain a
prima facie case of trademark infringement under section 43(a)).
160
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916) (“[T]he trademark is
treated as merely a protection for the good will, and not the subject of property except in
connection with an existing business.”); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
161
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co. 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
162
United Drug, 248 U.S. at 97 (“[T]he fundamental error of supposing that a trademark right is a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or a patent for an
invention, to either of which, in truth, it has little or no analogy. There is no such thing as
property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade
in connection with which the mark is employed.” (internal citations omitted)).
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gesting that there is “no principled reason” not to extend a patent
remedies case to trademark law.
2. Equity, Discretion, and Statutory Injunctions
It will also be helpful, before turning to the Lanham Act and its
creation, to place the issue of equitable injunctive relief in historical
context. To begin with, it is clearly true that, at least as understood
by U.S. courts, “flexibility rather than rigidity” is the “essence of
equity jurisdiction.”163 Thus, the decision to grant or deny injunctive relief has long been committed to the federal district courts’
“sound discretion.”164
It is equally true, however, that district court discretion has
long been channeled through various evidentiary and procedural
devices; “structured sets of presumptions and safety valves,” as a
team of scholars recently put it.165 General equitable discretion, for
instance, has long been limited by presumptions for and against irreparable injury.166 Equitable discretion, moreover, has traditionally been bounded by the existence of the underlying right itself, and
a plaintiff’s general entitlement to at least some effective remedy.167
163

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
164
Id.; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978) (“It is correct, of course,
that a federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an
injunction for every violation of law. . . . As a general matter it may be said that ‘since all
or almost all equitable remedies are discretionary, the balancing of equities and hardships
is appropriate in almost any case as a guide to the chancellor’s discretion.’” (quoting
DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES 52 (1973))); DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.1(1), at 57 (“One other
striking characteristic of equity and equitable remedies is a high degree of discretion.”).
165
Gergen et al., supra note 13, at 249; cf. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.4(7), at 116 (“[T]o
get a better picture of the discretion exercised by judges in equitable remedy cases, we
should recognize that the modern American judge does not exercise unlimited
discretion.”).
166
See Gergen et al., supra note 13, at 220–25 (discussing twentieth century
presumptions of irreparable injury for trespass in the cutting of timber, physical
encroachment, breaches of contract to sell land, violations of restrictive covenants,
copyright and trademark infringement, and against irreparable injury for general breaches
of contract and dispossession of chattels).
167
DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.4(7), at 119 (“Equity courts never claimed the power to
deny a plaintiff’s legal rights except by substantive defenses like estoppel. . . . [E]quity
should not exercise discretion to deny even purely equitable remedies where equitable
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Thus, while it would have been more or less unheard of for a
nineteenth or early twentieth century intellectual property statute
to grant an absolute entitlement to an injunction against infringers,168 thereby eviscerating any discretion by the court, it would
have been considered perfectly normal to presume that continuing
intellectual property infringement is an inherently irreparable
harm, not compensable by monetary relief.169 In short, simply because “the hallmark of equity is its flexibility” it does not hold that
the use of presumptions is inconsistent with injunctive relief.170
This is particularly true with respect to that subset of injunctions issued pursuant to statutory authority, known as statutory
injunctions.171 Often these statutes authorize or require an injunction, but appear at the same time to retain equitable discretion to
some degree, thus raising the “major issue” of how discretion and
statutory purpose are to be reconciled.172 As the remedies scholar
Dan Dobbs explains, courts regularly answer the statutory injunction riddle by adopting what is in effect a presumption: “the statute
might be understood to say to the judge, ‘Issue the injunction when
this statute is violated, unless you find some traditional equitable
reason to deny it and the reason you find is consistent with this sta-

remedies represent the only practical remedy or the only one that protects the core
rights.”).
168
Cf. Gergen et al., supra note 13, at 226–30 (“Even when denial of an injunction will
result in irreparable injury to the right holder and such injury completes a prima facie case
for injunctive relief, courts have traditionally refused to issue an injunction when such
relief will place an undue hardship on the right violator.”).
169
See infra Section III.A; see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 209–10 (2d ed. 1839) (“It
is quite plain, that, if no other remedy could be given in cases of patents and copy-rights,
than an action at law for damages, the inventor or author might be ruined by the necessity
of perpetual litigation, without ever being able to have a final establishment of his
rights.”).
170
DiSarro, supra note 114, at 54. Nor, for that matter, is injunctive relief nearly as
“extraordinary” a remedy in practice as often described in theory. See Laycock, supra
note 27, at 689. Although courts often refer to specific relief as a most extraordinary
exception to the usual rule favoring damages, that is “wildly wrong as a description of
what courts do.” Id. As Laycock concluded after an extensive empirical study a few
decades ago: “Injunctions are routine, and damages are never adequate unless the court
wants them to be.” Id. at 692.
171
See generally DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 243.
172
Id. § 2.10, at 246.
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tute’s goals.’”173 Indeed, many courts view statutory authorization
of an injunctive remedy “as a substitute for the irreparable injury
rule, so that, at least prima facie, a statutory injunction can go even
if the plaintiff would otherwise be denied relief because he has an
adequate remedy at law.”174 One scholar goes so far as to conclude,
after a thorough review of equity practice in the modern statutory
injunction setting, that “a court has no discretion or authority to
exercise equitable powers so as to permit violations of statutes to
continue.”175
The Lanham Act, of course, is a federal statute, and in expressly authorizing (but clearly not mandating) injunctive relief it is best
classed as a specie of statutory injunction.176 Viewed in this light,
eBay’s trademark problem is actually just one more instance of the
“major issue” identified by Dobbs of reconciling statutory injunctions and equitable discretion.177 Perhaps then the most jurisprudentially unusual thing about the courts’ struggle to adapt eBay to
trademark law is not their inconsistency, but rather their failure to
acknowledge the historically vexing nature of the inquiry and prior
attempts at solutions.
B. The Lanham Act’s Duality
Not surprisingly, the venerable question of how to reconcile a
statute authorizing injunctive relief with background discretion is,
“At least in the first instance . . . an issue of statutory construction.”178 Thus, this Article now turns to the Lanham Act itself to
understand how it meant for judges to wield the discretion it authorized.
Two familiar statutory provisions rest at the center of trademark
law’s eBay problem. Section 33 of the Lanham Act (“Registration
173

Id. § 2.10, at 246–47.
Id. § 2.10, at 243. See also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable
Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 524, 532 (1982) (“The case law reflects a remarkable, though
unheralded, consistency over the past fifty years: cases hold that statutes dispositively
define the nature of prohibited and permitted conduct, thereby removing one entire area
of discretion from the courts.”).
175
Id. at 525–26.
176
Id. at 528–29.
177
DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 246.
178
Id.
174
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on principal register as evidence of exclusive right to use mark; defenses”) states the basic principle of exclusivity:
Any registration . . . shall be prima facie evidence . . . of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the
registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the
goods or services specified in the registration . . . but
shall not preclude another person from proving any
legal or equitable defense or defect . . . which might
have been asserted if such mark had not been registered.179
Decades of interpretation have of course added layers of meaning to the text, but as a starting point the language literally purports
to grant a prevailing registrant the exclusive right to use its mark
with the goods or services listed in its registration. The rights of the
registrant are carved away by myriad exceptions,180 but the statutory baseline is an exclusive entitlement.
The immediately succeeding provision, section 34 of the Lanham Act (“Injunctive Relief”), could not be more contrary in spirit:
The several courts . . . shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity181
and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office or to prevent a violation under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of section 1125 of this title.182
179

15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012) (emphasis added); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (providing for
liability for infringement of these registered rights).
180
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his well-known dissent in Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park and Fly, Inc., the Lanham Act expressly identifies over twenty situations in which
infringement of even an incontestable mark is permitted. 469 U.S. 189, 206 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 206 n.1 (listing exceptions).
181
This phrase is nearly identical to that in the Patent Act interpreted in eBay. See 35
U.S.C. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).
182
15 U.S.C. § 1116. The reference to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Lanham Act section 43(a)) at
the end of the provision expressly brings claims based on unregistered rights with its
ambit, along within dilution and cybersquatting (Lanham Act sections 43(c) and (d)). The
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Here, there is no mention of exclusivity. Rather, it speaks in
terms of the federal courts’ “power” to grant injunctions under
“principles of equity” and upon “reasonable” terms. It is ex ante
discretion, codified.183 The closest the text comes to even acknowledging the prior provision’s exclusive use right is in the final oblique phrase just quoted, referring to “any right” of the registrant.
That, however, serves as a limit on the court’s ability to grant injunctions (they may only be granted so as to prevent rights violations, and not for other reasons). Utterly absent is any directive to
protect a prevailing registrant’s exclusivity. How, then, can we explain this at least facial inconsistency?
C. The Lanham Act’s Erratic Legislative History
1. The Early Drafts: State Law Rights Invested with a
National Reach
The early hearings on the first predecessor bills to what became
the Lanham Act were surprisingly vibrant affairs. Infused with a
clubby chumminess,184 and filled with colorful characters referencing Moliere185 and joking about the “late German Army,”186 transcript notations of “[Laughter]” are not uncommon.187 The old
boy atmosphere, however, masks substantial dissent surrounding
what were bills beset by internal inconsistencies on critical issues.

section 43(a) language was added in 1988. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15
U.S.C. § 1051. It is largely outside the scope of this Article to delve into the nuanced and
complex historical relationship between claims of infringement of registered and
unregistered rights, except to point out that none of the myriad modern cases detailed in
Part I of this Article draw a material distinction between the two provisions for purposes
of granting injunctive relief. See generally supra Part I.
183
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1116.
184
The following statement of Edward S. Rogers, a chief proponent of the bill, is
representative: “[Y]ou know in every well-conducted club the man that complains most
bitterly about the food is put on the house committee. I found myself as a result of that
paper [criticizing the earlier trademark act] made chairman . . . .” Trade-marks: Hearings
on H.R. 6248 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong. 23 (1926) [hereinafter Hearings
on H.R. 6248] (statement of Edward S. Rogers).
185
Id.
186
Registration of Trade-marks: Joint Hearings on S. 2679 Before the Comms. on Patents,
68th Cong. 50 (1925) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2679] (statement of Edward S. Rogers).
187
Hearings on H.R. 6248, supra note 184, at 20, 26.
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Namely, the central question of what it means to grant a national
exclusive use right to a common law-based trademark.
On one hand, the Senate’s initial Ernst bill of 1924 purported to
do little more than codify the common law of trademarks, including
the recently-Supreme-Court-endorsed common law principle that
trademark rights can by definition extend no further than the geographic reach of that usage in trade.188 The definitions section, for
instance, ended with the firm declaration that “Except as otherwise expressly provided, this act is declaratory of the common law
as to trade-marks . . . and in case of doubt its provisions are to be
construed accordingly.”189 Consistent with this, proponents of the
bill repeatedly described it (perhaps disingenuously) before the
committee as merely “procedural” in nature,190 a codification of
the common law,191 and modestly intended only to unify and clarify
in one statute the confusing array of federal trademark bills already
in force.192
188

S. 2679, 68th Cong. §31 (1924). For the referenced Supreme Court precedent see
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916) (“Since it is the trade, and
not the mark, that is to be protected, a trade-mark . . . extends to every market where the
trader’s goods have become known and identified by his use of the mark. But the mark, of
itself, cannot travel to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no trader to
offer the article.”). But see Hearings on S. 2679, supra note 186, at 55 (statement of James
T. Newton) (admitting that the bill goes “a little bit beyond” Hanover Star Milling, which
involved only unregistered rights, by investing registrations with a national reach, and
speculating that the drafters “anticipated what we believe the court would decide”).
189
Hearings on S. 2679, supra note 186, at 16.
190
Id. at 47 (statement of Edward S. Rogers) (stating that “section 18 is procedural
entirely”); id. at 75 (statement of Arthur C. Fraser) (stating that the bill works “by way of
simplifying procedure in trade-mark matters”); id. at 66–67 (“This registration does not
grant any rights. It is simply the public record of a claim of right, which on examination,
by the Patent Office, appears to be well-founded. . . . The act if passed will simply
perpetuate the present law in the main, but will make it more clear and elaborate it in
certain respects . . . .”).
191
Id. at 55 (statement of James T. Newton) (“We have tried to formulate what the
courts have held to be the trade-mark law. I am sure there is nothing in this bill that is
contrary to any decision of a court of last resort. The bill is really a formula of the words in
those decisions.”).
192
Id. at 4 (statement of Am. Bar Ass’n) (describing need of “co-ordination and
codification” of “scattered” “Federal statutory law of trade-marks”). In introducing the
successor House Bill, H.R. 6248, its main proponent, Edward S. Rogers, similarly
represented to the joint committee:
[S]ince there is no Federal common law, we have sought in this bill
only to apply the common law of trade-marks to commerce, over
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In stark contrast to these demure (and state-law-friendly) characterizations of the early legislation was the operative text of its
core provisions. Under the original Senate bill, an applicant for registration of a valid trademark, after declaring that he was “entitled
to the exclusive use of the trade-mark in the United States,”193
would receive a registration that was “prima facie evidence of
ownership”194 and “constructive notice to all persons.”195 The
proposed remedial provisions clarified the reach and power of this
exclusive right in no uncertain terms: An infringer “shall be liable . . . to an injunction retraining infringement of such registered
trade-mark,” which, subject only to the rights of registered concurrent users, “shall extend throughout the United States and shall
not be limited to be merely coextensive with the territory within
which such owner has used such registered trade-mark.”196
The entire design here, utterly contrary to the common law,
was structured to give brand owners the clear, national, and, critically, exclusive right to use the subject mark with the registered
goods and services.197 This tension was not lost on dissenters, who
specifically objected to the inconsistency of granting national exclusive rights, enforced by a nationwide injunction, while purporting to maintain the more territorially localized common law.198

which Congress has jurisdiction. We have not attempted to create
anything or to grant anything to anybody, but simply to preserve
evidence so that the common law would afford quicker and more
complete protection.
Hearings on H.R. 6248, supra note 184, at 24 (statement of Edward S. Rogers).
193
See Hearings on S. 2679, supra note 186, at 6–7.
194
Id. at 7.
195
Id. at 8.
196
Id. at 13.
197
See, e.g., id. at 77 (statement of Edward S. Rogers) (“The purpose [of section 18(h)]
was, of course, to make the right as nearly national as possible.”).
198
See, e.g., id. at 77, 134–35 (statement of Robert Watson) (inquiring about section
18(h) and noting the difficulty of making registered trade mark rights exclusive national
rights while still maintaining fidelity to the common law’s requirement that trademark
rights can only extend to the reaches of plaintiff’s actual use of the mark). Robert Watson
proposed as a solution striking out the “claim for exclusive right to the United States” in
the applicant’s declaration. Id. at 135; see id. at 55 (statement of James T. Newton)
(“After completing the bill there were a good many prominent members of the bar,
undoubtedly sound in their reasonings in general, who objected to the bill . . . .”).
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The drafters responded by offering some amendments in the
next year’s version of the bill, known as the Vestal bill, which attempted to counter the strength of the exclusive right by making
the injunction remedy more discretionary.199 But these changes did
not appear to placate the dissenters. They continued to complain,
for instance, that “[t]he bill has one purpose . . . and that is to nationalize trade-mark ownership by registration; to take this common-law right which arises in the States . . . put it through the rolls
and hand him out something that extends, like a copyright all over
the United States.”200 Karl Fenning, chairman of what is now the
American Intellectual Property Law Association, similarly observed, “Registration is in derogation of the common law” and
criticized the inconsistency of purporting to invest registered
trademarks with national exclusivity while claiming to preserve the
common law scheme.201
Meaningful criticism was, as shown, brought against the selfcontradictory nature of the Ernst and Vestal bills. The bills’ leading
proponent, Edward Rogers, and others, moreover, tried to add in
199

Specifically, the Hearings on H.R. 6248 tracked most of the statutory language
described above. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text. The mandatory “shalls”
in the injunction remedy, however, were softened to discretionary “mays” in the House
version. See Hearings on H.R. 6248, supra note 184, at 8 (“The remedy of injunction
against infringement of the registered trade-mark may extend throughout the United
States or any lesser territory, as may be determined by the court according to the
circumstances of the case, and need not be limited to be merely coextensive with the
territory within which the owner has used such registered trade-mark . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
200
Hearings on H.R. 6248, supra note 184, at 138 (statement of Robert Watson).
Relying on Roger’s own statements at the 1925 hearings to support his cause, Watson
argued that the proposed 1926 legislation was intended to derogate substantially from the
common law despite its claims otherwise. See id. at 136.
201
Id. at 127 (statement of Karl Fenning). He continues by lamenting:
The common law is the thing which the courts enforce at the present
time. . . . The common law still controls. Now, having put in these 35
sections this bill says, “nothing in this act shall prevent, lessen,
impede, or avoid any remedy at law or in equity which any party
aggrieved by any wrongful use of any trade-mark may have had at
common law.” . . . That is, we go through all this fol de rol, and when
we get through we say we don’t mean anything. You all go back to the
common law and start right where you are.
Id. Fenning instead advocated for a more consistently federalized bill that would actually
“put some teeth into” the registration scheme. Id. at 130.
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some discretion to check that criticism. Far more early controversy, however, was generated by the unrelated deposit provisions.202
Thus, while the Vestal bill twice passed the House and was reported favorably by the relevant Senate committee, it never became
law.203
2. The Middle-Period Drafts: A True Attempt at
Nationalization
Ten years and a number of intervening attempts later the drafters, still lead by Edward Rogers, tried a different approach at reconciling the conflict between federal exclusivity through registration and the common law model of use-based fragmentation. By
1937, a new problem was perceived to have arisen in trademark
law—namely, the rise of compulsory state trademark registration
regimes.204 States, allegedly to generate Depression-era revenue,
had begun passing laws effectively requiring registration in that
state for marks used there.205 Businesses that failed to register
could see their marks appropriated by those that did. Thus, for instance, Rogers explained that a major pharmaceutical company
might find itself forced to register each of its 100-odd brands in
each such state, at no small expense to itself.206
The solution, according to the first true “Lanham” bill, H.R.
9041 of 1938,207 was finally to create a truly “substantive” federal
trademark law that would regulate all interstate commerce and supersede state law.208 The bill dropped any mention of tracking the

202

Id. at 12, 17 (statement of A.C. Paul) (describing opposition from Henry Thomson
(founder of the search company) and the United States Trade Mark Association (now
known as “INTA”)); id. at 73–78 (statement of Walter C. Hughes) (objecting to the bill).
203
Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the Comm. on Patents, Subcomm. on TradeMarks, 75th Cong. 11 (1938) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 9041] (statement of Edward S.
Rogers).
204
See id. at 12.
205
See id.
206
Id. at 11–12 (outlining mandatory state registration phenomenon).
207
H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. (1938).
208
See Hearings on H.R. 9041, supra note 203, at 14 (statement of Henry D. Williams);
see also id. at 15 (“We propose . . . doing away with the present arrangement wherein the
trade-mark rights rest solely on the common law, or the common law as modified by State
statutes. The scheme is stupendous in its effects.”).
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“common law,”209 and instead made it “unlawful” to “use in
commerce” any mark likely to be confused with a registered
mark.210 The scope was truly national, with certificates of registration “effective throughout the United States.”211 Infringers remained “liable—to (1) an injunction restraining infringement of
such registered trade-mark” throughout the United States, enforceable by any court having jurisdiction.212 The sole remedial exception was a limited prior user affirmative defense.213 The goal was
clear—to pass “a single statute which makes trade-mark property
more secure, to the full extent of Congressional power over it.”214
Representative Fritz Lanham himself thought the Act, if passed,
would go so far as to preempt the trademark field (what he called
“an assertion of domination of interstate commerce by Congress”)
to the exclusion of state law.215
Dissenting commentators likewise saw this first Lanham draft
as a “stupendous” shift.216 A representative for the Boston Patent
Law Association saw it as a “complete change in the theory of
trade-marks” in that it would “substitute for [the common law] a
creation of an artificial monopoly in a trade-mark by an act of registration.”217 This same commentator added that “the remedies
209

See, e.g., H.R. 9041 § 43 (eliminating the language mandating interpretations
consistent with the common law).
210
Id. at pmbl.
211
Id. § 8.
212
Id. §§ 34(a)(1), 38.
213
Id. § 34(b).
214
Hearings on H.R. 9041, supra note 203, at 11, 13 (statement of Edward S. Rogers); see
also id. at 25 (statement of John A. Dienner) (advocating for creation of a true “Federal
trade-mark”); id. at 62 (statement of U.S. Trade-mark Ass’n) (supporting Congress
“entering into the field of substantive trade-mark law” with the Lanham bill). More than
one colloquy at the hearing concerned whether trademark rights are properly understood
as a “property right”; however, even by 1938 this was considered to be an age-old and
largely immaterial dispute. See, e.g., id. at 50 (statement of Edward S. Rogers) (“Of
course there has been a dispute always as to whether a trade-mark was property or
not. . . . What we are trying to do by this measure is to give greater security to that
property, and whether it is property or not, it is certainly a right, and it is a right to be
secured against fraud, and that is all that any trade-mark is, in its last analysis.”); cf. id. at
53 (Rogers himself considered trademarks as property, and infringements as trespasses to
that property).
215
Id. at 45 (statement of Rep. Fritz G. Lanham).
216
Id. at 15 (statement of Henry D. Williams).
217
Id. at 38 (statement of Harrison F. Lyman).
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which it provides for the infringement of this artificially created
right are very stringent and are far-reaching.”218
Even Rogers, however, ultimately stopped short of embracing
the most extreme implications of such a federalized and propertized piece of legislation as the first Lanham bill—namely, an absolute entitlement for a registrant to stop infringing uses. For all his
advocacy for strengthening the “trade-mark property” right, he
still understood the bill as giving some level of remedial discretion
to the courts.
In particular, Rogers was asked by Chauncey P. Carter, a strong
proponent of retaining a state-based common law trademark rights
regime,219 to clarify what limits if any there were to a registrant’s
apparently absolute right to an injunction in a case, for instance, of
a geographically remote junior user that cannot show “damages.”220 In language that is, at best, unclear, Rogers responded:
A man does not get an injunction unless he has a
right which is immediately likely to be infringed, or
unless he is immediately likely to be subjected to irreparable damage. Nobody wants to change the
practice of a court of equity by this or any other statute. Section 1 [establishing liability] simply means
that here is recognition. If you are damaged you are
entitled to any remedy that any man who has a right
of action is entitled to. It does not prejudice any
case. It is a wide organic section, providing that certain acts are held to be objectionable.221
Rogers seems here to be suggesting that background rules of
equity, including the rule that denies equitable relief until irreparable harm is imminent, inherently limited the otherwise absolute
exclusive right in the draft text of then section 1 (the operative pro-

218

Id. at 43; see also id. at 30 (statement of Chauncy P. Carter) (objecting that “there is
no reservation of common-law rights” in draft legislation).
219
See generally id. at 30–36.
220
Id. at 69–70 (hypothesizing a local registrant in Washington, D.C. that seeks to
enjoin a use in Oregon or California).
221
Id. at 71 (statement of Edward S. Rogers).
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vision barring infringement generally).222 But Rogers nowhere attempts to explain how these background rules of equity are to be
reconciled with the registrant’s otherwise unqualified (“wide organic”) national right to prevent other uses of the registered mark
for any goods listed in the registration.223
Rogers was of course speaking here ex tempore, so his remarks
must be taken with caution.224 Nevertheless, these remarks are critical. They are the most direct statement, throughout the twentyfive year legislative history, of a drafter’s vision of the statutory
discretion to grant or deny trademark injunctions with which the
district courts were to be empowered in the Lanham Bill.
Indeed, the very next draft of the text, H.R. 4744 of March
1939,225 effectively codified Roger’s understanding—discussed
above—that equitable discretion inherently existed in the district
courts to enforce the injunction remedy. Namely, the new text gave
federal courts “power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable.”226 This language (then section 33) has remained unchanged to the present day where it can be found in section 34 of

222

In requiring “immedia[cy]” Rogers seems to have intended to track the usual rule of
equity that harm must be “imminent” (if not actual) before a court will issue an
injunction. See 5 BARRY A. LINDHAL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION §
46:12 (2d ed. 2002) (A court of equity “is empowered to prevent imminent injury if there
is sufficient reason to anticipate such injury and the court is satisfied that irreparable
damage would result unless injunctive relief is granted, even though the complainant may
not yet have suffered injury as a result of the actual or threatened violation.”).
223
One explanation is that Rogers was prefiguring, in essence, the Dawn Donut
doctrine. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir.
1959). Under that doctrine, a registrant cannot enjoin a geographically remote junior user
of a confusingly similar mark prior to the time when the registrant is likely to expand into
the junior user’s market. See id; cf. Carter, supra note 5, at 790–95 (discussing Dawn
Donut’s relation to the theory of federal trademark law). Rogers’ response, and the
ensuing amendment to the text, however, were far broader in reach than just the Dawn
Donut geographically remote junior user context.
224
One explanation for this equivocation is that Rogers is acting as a slippery strategist
here, telling the Congressmen what he thinks they want to hear in order to push his bill
through.
225
H.R. 4744, 76th Cong. (1939).
226
Id. § 33.
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the current Lanham Act.227 It is the very language at the heart of
the eBay trademark troubles.
Next to no mention, however, was made of this change in the
three-day House hearings on the new bill, H.R. 4744, introduced
six months later.228 The House Subcommittee on Trade-Marks,
chaired by Representative Lanham, painstakingly marched one by
one through each provision of that draft.229 Yet, apart from Representative Lanham’s opening explanation, “A number of controversies were ironed out in those [1938] hearings and this bill is predicated on the results of those hearings,” the hearings give no explanation as to the meaning of this change to section 33. Indeed, section 33 is not once referenced by name in the 216 pages of transcript.230 Either way, like all others before it, H.R. 4744 never made
it into law, however the equitable discretion language of section 33
remained.231
3. The Final Drafts: A Patchwork Compromise Lacking
Explanation
The robust attempts at a truly substantive and preemptive federal trademark bill in the late 1930s retreated in the 1940s to, once
again, a modest proposed grant of so-called “remedial rights” or
“procedural rights” designed to be more in harmony with the
common law of trademarks.232 The comments of Daphne Robert,
who took over as ABA spokesperson for the bill before Congress,
regarding innovations in the bill are most notable for their understated nature. The main change from prior law, she noted, would be
“an incentive to register” through the potential of attaining incontestability.233 Robert failed to refer to the statutory remedies in her
227

Lanham Act § 34, 15 U.S.C. §1116 (2012).
See generally H.R. 4744, 76th Cong. (1939).
229
Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Comm. on Patents, Subcomm. on Trademarks, 76th Cong. 12 (1939) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4744] (statement of Rep. Fritz
G. Lanham) (proposing section-by-section review).
230
See generally id.
231
See, e.g., H.R. 6618, 76th Cong. §33 (1939).
232
Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R. 82 Before the Subcomm. on the Comm. on Patents, 78th
Cong. 20 (1944) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 82] (statement of Daphne Robert). By
1944, Robert had taken over from Edward Rogers as the ABA’s leading advocate for new
trademark legislation.
233
Id. at 21.
228
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opening comments, noting just that registrants would be “entitled
to protection” against imitations of a mark.234
Reflective of the more tentative approach of the later drafts,
H.R. 82 (which, in all material points, became the Lanham Act)
gave conflicting direction as to the exclusive rights given to a registrant.235 On one hand, the language of the bill (as with the ultimate
statute) gave to registrants the prima facie “exclusive right to use
the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services
specified in the certificate,”236 and “commerce” was defined to
include “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”237 In other words, the registrant was facially entitled to the
exclusive right to use the registered mark with the listed goods
throughout the entire U.S. interstate economy. On the other hand,
as discussed earlier regarding the final statutory language, the remedial section concerning injunctions, section 34, permissively
gave courts the “power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable.”238
That remedial discretion and the grant of exclusive rights might
conflict was not lost on the committee members at the hearing.
When asked point blank by the Chair of the senate committee,
Senator Claude Pepper, whether the bill entitled the registrant to
“the exclusive right to use the trade mark throughout the United
States,”239 Leslie Frazer, the First Assistant Commissioner of Patents, denied that was the case. According to him, whether such a
registrant “could successfully enjoin someone” was for “a court of
equity to determine.”240 Senator Pepper then openly criticized the

234

Id. at 24. A subsequent commentator was similarly terse in describing the relief
available to registrants as “greater” under the new act than the old. Id. at 29 (statement of
Henry J. Savage).
235
H.R. 82, 78th Cong. (1944).
236
Id. § 7(b).
237
Id. § 45.
238
Id. § 34.
239
Hearings on H.R. 82, supra note 232, at 42 (statement of Sen. Claude Pepper).
240
Id. (statement of Leslie Frazer).
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bill for failing to clarify “the effect of registration” which he
thought ought to be determined “as matter of law.”241
The equivocal nature of the bill is further underscored by fundamental disagreement among commentators as to the meaning of
these provisions. Some criticized it for failing “to get better protection” for registrants who justifiably “expected to get a deed of title
in their trade mark.”242 Others, most particularly representatives
of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, attacked it on
precisely opposite grounds as a “radical” change in the nature of
trademark rights in the United States “from protection as a mark
as an indication of the origin of product to that of protecting an exclusive right in the name of the product itself.”243 The final language of the Lanham Act as passed, still with us today, effectively
codified the split at the hearings by incorporating the exclusive
rights and equitable discretion language discussed above without
further clarification.
III.

MAKING SENSE OF THE CURRENT MUDDLE

As shown, there is next to no explication in the Lanham Act’s
legislative history regarding what Rogers meant when, in discussing
limits to a registrant’s exclusive national right, he observed, “Nobody wants to change the practice of a court of equity by this or any
other statute.”244 As the drafters immediately proceeded to amend
the bill to add the key “according to the principles of equity” language in the very next draft, it becomes critical to understand those
same “practice[s].” What, then, was the equity practice of courts
in trademark cases in the late 1930s and early 1940s when the Lanham Act was being shaped?

241

Id. (statement of Sen. Claude Pepper). The colloquy continues for pages in the
transcript, as the committee and commentators try in vain to make sense of the conflict.
242
Id. at 37, 42 (statement of Paul Struven).
243
Id. at 58 (statement of Department of Justice). A Columbia professor at the hearing
similarly described it as “go[ing] too far in the direction of creating new property rights
which may be mischievous.” Id. at 107 (statement of Milton Handler).
244
Hearings on H.R. 9041, supra note 203, at 71 (statement of Edward S. Rogers).
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A. Trademark Injunction Practice at the Time of the Lanham Act
Much as they did just prior to eBay, courts of the first half of
the twentieth century generally presumed that trademark infringement caused continuing harm and thus enjoined defendants,
under their equitable powers, from ongoing infringement without
requiring further proof of injury, actual confusion, or bad faith intent.245 This was particularly true for so-called “technical trademarks” which were registrable under earlier acts and included
most of what we consider valid trademarks now, but excluded categories such as descriptive marks that have acquired distinctiveness
and service marks.246 Even, however, in cases of unfair competition
for non-technical trademarks, which unlike technical trademark
infringement claims required an affirmative showing of fraud or

245

See Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 109 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir.
1939) (“Generally the prior appropriator may enjoin use of an identical name by a
subsequent arrival. . . . In such circumstances little evidence of injury, actual or probable,
is needed—the mere identity makes it practically inevitable. From this fact comes the
idea that a conclusive presumption of unfairness and injury exists. On such facts the
presumption should be conclusive. Fair trade protection requires it.”); see also Feil v. Am.
Serum Co., 16 F.2d 88, 90 (8th Cir. 1926) (“[N]either a fraudulent intent to injure the
complainant nor an actual misleading of the public need to be proved. They will be and
are presumed.”); Nat’l Picture Theatres v. Found. Film Corp., 266 F. 208, 211 (2d. Cir.
1920) (“[T]he necessary consequences of such a colorable imitation of plaintiff’s name as
is defendant’s is deception of the public; and, finally, no equity is shown against plaintiff’s
prompt demand. Therefore as matter of law plaintiff was entitled to injunction.”);
Peninsular Chem. Co. v. Levinson, 247 F. 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1917) (reversing lower court
and ordering entry of injunction); Coca-Cola Co. v. Carlisle Bottling Works, 43 F.2d 101,
109 (E.D. Ken. 1929) (“[W]hen a trade mark is calculated to deceive an intent to deceive
will be presumed and an injunction to prevent its use will be granted, even if no one has
actually been deceived” (quoting 26 WILLIAM M. MCKINNEY, RULING CASE LAW §52, at
874 (1920))).
246
See Scriven v. North, 134 F. 366, 375 (4th Cir. 1904) (“There are certain elements of
property right in a technical trade-mark . . . and proof of actual intention to injure is
dispensed with, and injunction goes as of course . . . .”); Gannert v. Rupert, 127 F. 962,
963–64 (2d Cir. 1904) (enjoining infringement of technical trademark; actual damage
need not be shown for injunction to issue). For an overview of the pre-Lanham Act
distinction between technical and non-technical trademarks see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note
21, § 4:4.
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bad faith for liability to attach,247 the regular remedy upon a finding
of liability remained an injunction.248
Pre-Lanham Act courts of course retained discretion ultimately
to grant or deny injunctions, which were never an absolute entitlement, under estoppel principals,249 or as a result of equitable balancing and undue hardship analyses.250 But then, just as now, that
discretion was “coerce[d]” by underlying rules of law.251 One can
thus comfortably conclude that, prior to the Lanham Act, courts in
the United States had been presuming a prevailing plaintiff’s entitlement to injunctive relief in trademark cases in some form since
the time Congress passed the first trademark statute in 1870.252
247

See Samson Cordage Works v. Puritan Cordage Mills, 211 F. 603, 608 (6th Cir.
1914); Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 278–80 (D. Ind. 1900).
248
Scriven, 134 F. at 380–81 (“We are of [the] opinion that the complainants have filed
[sic] to establish a valid technical trade-mark; but, inasmuch as the testimony shows
unfair competition, which entitles them to an injunction, it is deemed unnecessary to
discuss the distinctions which seem to differentiate this case from one of trade-mark, pure
and simple—the foundation principle upon which relief is granted being substantially the
same and the like remedy invoked.”); see also Samson Cordage Works, 211 F. at 611
(reversing denial of preliminary injunction in unfair competition case).
249
Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 F. 24, 32 (8th Cir. 1910)
(stating, in a trademark case, “a court of equity will not move to enforce one’s rights who
has knowingly delayed to enforce them so long that the defendant in reliance upon the
owner’s acquiescence in his violation of them has made such investments and so changed
his position that it would be more inequitable to enforce the owner’s rights than to leave
them in the state in which he has been content to permit them to be for an unreasonable
length of time,” and rejecting defense on facts of case); see, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Crown
Cent. Petroleum Corp. 50 F. Supp. 891, 897 (D. Md. 1943) (denying injunction in part
because delay in enforcement suggested that plaintiffs did not truly believe themselves
prejudiced by the infringement). But see Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 523 (1888)
(noting that delay alone is generally not a valid reason to deny an injunction against
continuing infringement, and that laches alone, without any estoppel, bars only monetary
relief).
250
Int’l Film Serv. Co. v. Associated Producers, 273 F. 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1921) (denying
preliminary injunction in unfair competition case where defendant invested substantially
in the title of its play and did not use plaintiff’s similar title intentionally).
251
Nat’l Picture Theatres v. Found. Film Corp., 266 F. 208, 210–11 (2d Cir. 1920)
(reversing denial of preliminary injunctive relief in trademark case).
252
See, e.g., Menendez, 128 U.S. at 523 (affirming grant of injunction despite period of
delay in seeking enforcement; “the wrong is a continuing one, demanding restraint by
judicial interposition when properly invoked.”). This tradition in the United States is
quite longstanding. The influential early trademark treatise writer William Henry Browne
observed about trademark remedies in 1873 that, “it is not essential that the article should
be inferior in quality, or that the individual should fraudulently represent it, so as to
impose upon the public; but if, by representation, it be so assimilated as to be taken in the
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This is consistent with the view of the first Restatement of
Torts, published the very same year, 1938, in which Rogers made
his statements about equity practice in trademark cases.253 Using
clearly discretionary language, the central section governing injunctive relief in trademark infringement and unfair competition cases
allows that courts “may” grant an injunction against infringers.254
The comments explicating this discretion, though, make clear that
“equitable relief,” not damages, is the “usual form of relief” in
trademark cases “and an injunction is the usual relief granted.”255
Consistent with general theories of equity and irreparable harm
discussed previously, the 1938 Restatement’s injunction default in
trademark cases was based on the express understanding that
trademark infringement is a continuing course of harmful conduct
and that damages are difficult to measure.256 Indeed, “if repetition
of [defendant’s] conduct is likely, an injunction will issue against
him though he acted in good faith and even in ignorance of the
plaintiff’s interest” and even if defendant has ceased its wrongful
conduct.257
B. Connecting Trademark Injunction Practice to the High Bar for
Monetary Relief
Also consistent with the Lanham Act’s injunction-default
mindset, the Act has long been understood to deny monetary relief
market for an established manufacture, or compound of another, the injured person is
entitled to an injunction.” WILLIAM H. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS AND ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS § 468 (1873). The first U.S. trademark act, the Act of
1870, similarly gave a statutory right to injunctive relief for trademark infringement,
subject to equitable principals. See Act of July 8, 1870, § 79, 16 Stat. 198 (permitting “the
party aggrieved [to] have his remedy according to the course of equity to enjoin the
wrongful use of his trade-mark”). The Act was held to be unconstitutional by In re Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96–97 (1879).
253
See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 744 (AM. LAW INST. 1938).
254
Id.
255
Id. § 744 cmt. a.
256
Id. (“Such an unfair trade practice is ordinarily not a single event but a continuous
course of business conduct and the person harmed by this conduct is subjected to
continuing, and often increasing, harm. . . . Frequently the harm may not be reparable by
an action for damages because of the difficulty of computing the amount of the loss or of
establishing the causal connection between the loss and the wrongful conduct.”).
257
Id. § 744 cmt. b. An injunction, moreover, is deemed proper in three of the four
illustrations following the comments. Id. § 744 illus. 1–3.
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in ordinary infringement cases.258 The lion’s share of Lanham Act
cases deny monetary relief (including both an accounting of defendant’s profits and consequential damages) to prevailing infringement plaintiffs unless they can show “something more” than infringement itself.259 Professor McCarthy accurately sums up the
advice plaintiffs’ attorneys have long counseled their trademark
clients: “[O]btaining a strongly worded injunction should be
viewed as a ‘win’ in a trademark infringement case and that recovery of a monetary award of any kind is problematical.”260
Courts, for instance, embrace the Lanham Act’s invitation to
subject monetary relief (like injunctive relief) to “principles of equity”261 and rarely grant such relief “without some evidence of
fault or knowingly performing illegal acts.”262 In Pebble Beach Co. v.
Tour 18 I Ltd., for instance, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of
profits to a prevailing infringement plaintiff due to the absence of

258

See, e.g., A & H Sportswear v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, 166 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir.
1998) (finding no basis to award damages or impose royalty fees where prevailing
infringement plaintiff offered no evidence of lost profits or other harm); Int’l Star Class
Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1996)
(affirming denial of damages to prevailing infringement plaintiff absent evidence of actual
confusion or pecuniary harm; remanding for consideration of whether defendant acted in
bad faith thereby entitling plaintiff to accounting of profits); George Basch Co. v. Blue
Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537–40 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that damages are not available
to prevailing infringement plaintiff absent showing of actual confusion or intentionally
deceptive acts, and an accounting of profits not available absent showing of “willful
deception”). Common fact patterns where courts do allow monetary relief for trademark
infringement claims include willful passing off, see, e.g., Klein-Becker USA, LLC v.
Englert, 711 F.3d 1153, 1163 (10th Cir. 2013) (awarding $673,988.17 as defendant’s profits
where defendant infringed willfully), and in the related holdover licensee context, see, e.g.,
Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Gadsden Motel Co., 804 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1986). Courts often
also award statutory damages for counterfeiting pursuant to their independent authority
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2012). See, e.g., Luxottica Group, S.p.A. v. Casa Los Martinez
Corp., No. 1:14-cv-22859-JAL, 2014 WL 4948632, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2014) (listing
various awards). For an extensive and thoughtful review of monetary relief in trademark
cases see James K. Koelemay, Jr., Monetary Relief for Trademark Infringement under the
Lanham Act, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 458 (1983).
259
5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:58.
260
Id.
261
§ 1117(a) mandates that any monetary award remains subject to the principles of
equity. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 582, 584–85
(5th Cir. 1980).
262
5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:58.
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evidence of “palming off,” “diverted sales,” or “willfulness.”263
Likewise, where a plaintiff seeks consequential damages, as opposed to an equitable accounting, most courts require a showing of
actual confusion, not just the likely confusion needed to prevail on
the merits for liability purposes.264
The rule denying monetary relief in the usual trademark case, it
should be underscored, was equally potent at the time of the Lanham Act’s passage. Indeed, a leading historic case for the proposition that monetary relief requires a heightened showing of bad conduct beyond just infringement (such as fraud or palming off) was
decided in 1947 (the same year the Lanham Act was passed) under
the old 1905 Act.265 In a case of ordinary trademark infringement,
an injunction was deemed enough “to satisfy the equities of the
case.”266
As these pre-Lanham Act cases also show, the difficulties of attaining monetary relief are closely tied to the relative (historic) ease

263

Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 555 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947)). As a general rule of
thumb, trademark plaintiffs see an accounting of defendant’s profits as the preferred form
of monetary relief, due to the extreme difficulty of proving lost sales or other forms of
consequential damage in a non-willful infringement case. See Fishman Transducers, Inc.
v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 194 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Various damage theories are available, but
proving causation and amount are very difficult unless the two products directly compete
(an issue to which we return), and most cases that go beyond injunctive relief involve an
attempt to recoup the infringer’s profits.”).
264
See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 525 (10th Cir. 1987)
(“Although damages may be awarded for a violation of section 43(a), the award is
distinguishable from injunctive relief, because plaintiff bears a greater burden of proof of
entitlement. Likelihood of confusion is insufficient; to recover damages plaintiff must
prove it has been damaged by actual consumer confusion or deception resulting from the
violation.”).
265
Champion Spark Plug, 331 U.S. at 131 (affirming denial of accounting).
266
Id. at 131–32; see also Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. Congress Cigar Co., 118 F.2d 64, 71–72
(6th Cir. 1941) (granting injunction but denying accounting where “no actual wrongful
intent to injure appellant has been shown, and no substantial damage seems yet to have
been inflicted upon appellant from the use by appellee of the trade-mark”);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 744 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (“If repetition of
his conduct is likely, an injunction will issue against him though he acted in good faith and
even in ignorance of the plaintiff’s interest. But in such a case, damages and an
accounting of profits are not awarded.”).
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of attaining an injunction.267 To the extent that eBay upends that
assumption, these denial-of-monetary-relief cases need to be seriously reconsidered.268 Indeed, it is fair to say that in regions such
as the Ninth Circuit, where eBay has been understood to put the
burden on prevailing trademark plaintiffs to show irreparable harm
and justify injunctive relief, those prevailing plaintiffs have the presumptive entitlement to neither money nor an injunction even
where they have met all of the elements for liability.
Put another way, a plaintiff that has shown that a defendant’s
mark is likely to be confused with its valid, registered mark has established infringement of a statutory exclusive right under the Lanham Act.269 Yet, without adducing more evidence (i.e., of actual
confusion, irreparable harm, etc.), it is not eligible for any relief.
This comes very close to the scenario described by Dobbs in the
epigraph of this Article: “To deny all remedy is to deny the right
itself. . . . [It is] not so easy to think that the Congress means statutory rights to come and go in the discretion of a federal judge.”270
But that is the very result that arises when eBay is extended with
full force to trademark law.271
267

Cases denying monetary relief almost universally assume that a prevailing plaintiff
will still be entitled to injunctive relief. Champion Spark Plug, 331 U.S. at 132; Brunswick,
832 F.2d at 525; Hemmeter Cigar, 118 F.2d at 71–72.
268
The Third Restatement of Unfair Competition does appear to relax any
intentionality requirement for proof of damages, as opposed to an accounting of profits.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
Nevertheless, the cases remain few where a prevailing trademark infringement plaintiff
can attain damages upon a mere showing of likely confusion because of how difficult those
damages are to prove. See, e.g., Fishman Transducers, Inc., 684 F.3d at 194 (“[D]amages
can be awarded without a finding of willfulness. But damages awards turn out to be
comparatively rare in trademark cases primarily, it appears, because of the difficulty of
proving them.”).
269
15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1114 (2012).
270
DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 248.
271
In the eBay case itself, the Supreme Court purported to address this apparent
doctrinal inconsistency on the patent side by pretending that it didn’t exist. More
particularly, the Supreme Court criticized the Federal Circuit for essentially confusing a
right with a remedy. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006)
(“According to the Court of Appeals, this statutory right to exclude alone justifies its
general rule in favor of permanent injunctive relief. But the creation of a right is distinct
from the provision of remedies for violations of that right.” (internal citations omitted)).
While it is of course true that the two are analytically distinct, that does not mean that
courts should take no effort to harmonize rights with remedies. The two are intimately
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One final quirk to consider is the interplay of trademark’s high
monetary relief hurdle with element two of eBay’s “traditional”
test for injunctive relief: the inadequacy of monetary damages at
law.272 Together, they create a jarring feedback loop. Namely, element two suggests that the harder it is to attain monetary relief, the
easier it should be for a plaintiff to attain injunctive relief. But
courts based their historically heightened standard for monetary
relief in trademark cases (discussed above) in large part on the ease
and adequacy of attaining injunctive relief. In short, the Lanham
Act’s current scheme for relief in trademark cases appears to be as
follows: a plaintiff’s entitlement to injunctive relief depends on that
plaintiff’s entitlement to monetary relief which depends on that
plaintiff’s entitlement to injunctive relief, ad infinitum.
CONCLUSION
As shown, thanks to the efforts of its federal-minded and
strong-trademark-rights proponents, the Lanham Act promised
registrants ex ante exclusive use rights for registered goods and
services throughout all interstate commerce.273 When pushed in
the hearings to defend the absolute nature of such a right by those
who envisioned the Lanham Act as a codification of state-based
common law trademark practice, however, those same proponents
backed away and claimed that the exclusive right was actually substantially limited (sub silentio) by the inherent equitable discretion
of district courts to determine when and how to enforce such a
right through an injunction. In the immediate successor bill, we
suddenly saw the implied understanding made express, with laninterrelated. As Dobbs points out: “The ground for relief and the scope of that relief are
both found in the right itself.” DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.9(2), at 227; see also Claeys, supra
note 134, at 860 (criticizing eBay’s right/remedy language as confusing and possibly a
significant “conceptual error”).
272
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. This factor is particularly ill-suited to application in trademark
cases. As discussed above, see supra note 263, the leading form of monetary relief sought
in trademark cases is an accounting of defendant’s profits—an equitable remedy. This is
not a remedy at law. When courts apply eBay prong two to trademark cases, did the
Supreme Court mean for them only to focus on the adequacy of consequential damages,
as opposed to all the various (equitable and non-equitable) forms of monetary relief the
Act allows?
273
15 U.S.C. § 1057(b).
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guage added granting ex post discretion to the courts. Nowhere did
anyone attempt to explain how to reconcile these fundamentally
divergent, if not flatly inconsistent, visions of trademark exclusivity.
In the decades after passage of the Act and prior to the eBay decision, the courts continued with their pre-existing, working solution to this difficulty. Per the statute, the district courts retained
discretion to grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
when faced with a likelihood of confusion between a protected and
infringing mark; however, that discretion was substantially channeled through the near universal adoption of a presumption of irreparable harm and, in many cases, equally strong appellate guidance
that injunctions were to be the remedy of choice in trademark actions.274 This was consistent with both historic practice in trademark cases specifically, and in equity’s approach to statutory injunctions generally (that is, by treating the statutory authority as, in
effect, a substitute for the irreparable injury rule).275 To complete
the delicate balancing act, the courts offset this finger on the scale
for plaintiffs by limiting the availability of monetary relief.
Then came eBay. Modestly purporting to apply traditional
principals of equity, but more accurately creating a new test out of
spare parts found throughout the law of equitable remedies, it at a
minimum increased discretion to district courts to deny injunctions
in patent cases.276 As eBay exploded across the legal landscape, the
federal courts struggled to nail down what seems on its face to be a
simple question: Does eBay, a patent case, apply to trademark law?
Despite the fact that the respective patent and trademark injunctive relief provisions use identical statutory language, this
question has bedeviled the courts—and for a good reason. eBay
knocked over a house of cards built atop a divided foundation. The
drafters simply could not find a way to reconcile the views of those
who wanted to give the federal trademark law substance, by giving
an exclusive federal right, with those who did not, preferring to
keep the common law scheme. So it granted an exclusive right, but
274
275
276

DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 243–46.
Id.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94.
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reserved to the courts discretion to enforce it. That is an exclusive
right to judicial discretion—in other words, no exclusive right at
all.
As a result, in jurisdictions such as the Ninth Circuit, holders of
registered trademark rights that have demonstrated likely confusion with a junior use, have neither the presumptive right to stop
that use nor the right to get remunerated for it.277 In most others, it
is anyone’s guess as to what evidence a district court will require,
on top of evidence of likely confusion, to grant an injunction. At the
same time, the empirical data suggest that eBay has actually done
little to slow the grant of trademark injunctions—if anything,
courts nationally appear to grant injunctions to prevailing trademark plaintiffs at a higher rate post-eBay.278
The most practical fix to the current chaos is likely to keep preeBay presumption practice in trademark cases as something of a
happy compromise. The default system of entitlements countered
by equitable balancing and defenses is the closest the courts came
to capturing the convoluted vision of the Lanham Act’s drafters for
a judicially limited exclusive right. This could be accomplished
through very straightforward legal analysis by recognizing that
while eBay directly drew from copyright precedent,279 it never
made any mention of trademark law.280 And, it is consistent with
the historic and constitutional isolation, and principled differentiation, of trademark law from patent and copyright law.281
The better path, though, is to take a hard look at what we truly
mean when we grant someone a federal registration for, or otherwise acknowledge a federal right to, a trademark. Is that person entitled to be the only one to use that mark (or colorable imitations of
it) with the claimed goods and services, or not? Amazingly, after
nearly 150 years of granting trademark registrations in this country,
we still do not have a good answer to that most basic question.

277

See supra Section I.B.2.e.
See supra Section I.B.2.e.
279
eBay, 547 U.S. at 392–93.
280
Apart from an irrelevant mention of the “United States Patent and Trademark
Office,” the opinion never once uses the term “trademark.” See id. at 391 n.1.
281
See supra Section II.A.1.
278

